dbcve.org
Kamorta FirmwareOperating system · Qualcomm

CVE-2019-14089

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2020-09-08
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
u'Keymaster attestation key and device IDs provisioning which is a one time process is incorrectly allowed to be re-provisioned after a user data erase or a factory reset' in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in Kamorta, Nicobar, QCS404, QCS610, Rennell, SA515M, SA6155P, SC7180, SC8180X, SDX55, SM6150, SM7150, SM8150, SM8250, SXR2130

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Keymaster attestation key and device ID provisioning, which is designed to be a one-time operation during manufacturing, can be incorrectly re-provisioned after a user data erase or factory reset. This allows the same attestation keys to be regenerated, breaking the guarantee that these keys uniquely identify a specific device and undermining hardware attestation security.

MitigationApply the Qualcomm firmware patch (distributed via device OEM/ODM) to ensure Keymaster rejects re-provisioning attempts after factory reset. Until patched, be aware that device identity attestation may not be trustworthy on affected devices.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Kamorta FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Nicobar FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Qcs404 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Qcs610 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Rennell FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Sa515m FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Sa6155p FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions
Sc7180 FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the Qualcomm firmware variant
    Check the device system information or /proc/cpuinfo to determine the specific Qualcomm chip model (Kamorta, Nicobar, Qcs404, Qcs610, Rennell, Sa515m, Sa6155p, or Sc7180)
    Affected if The device uses any of the listed firmware variants (Kamorta, Nicobar, Qcs404, Qcs610, Rennell, Sa515m, Sa6155p, or Sc7180)
  2. Check if factory reset has been performed
    Determine whether the device has undergone a user data erase or factory reset since initial provisioning
    Affected if A factory reset has been performed on the device
  3. Verify attestation key uniqueness after reset
    Compare the Keymaster attestation certificate or device ID (such as the uniqueAttestationId or device ID) before and after a factory reset to see if they remain the same or change
    Affected if The attestation keys or device ID change after a factory reset, indicating they were regenerated rather than being unique per device
  4. Inspect Keymaster provisioning state
    Use Keymaster debug or diagnostic tools (if available) to query whether attestation keys have been provisioned more than once, checking for duplicate or re-provisioned key entries
    Affected if The Keymaster shows attestation keys were provisioned after a factory reset when they should have been set only once during manufacturing
  5. Check for multiple identical attestation certificates
    Extract and compare attestation certificates from multiple factory reset cycles on the same device to see if identical certificates are produced
    Affected if Identical attestation certificates appear after separate factory resets, confirming the vulnerability exists on that device

The device is affected if it uses any of the listed Qualcomm firmware variants (Kamorta, Nicobar, Qcs404, Qcs610, Rennell, Sa515m, Sa6155p, or Sc7180) and attestation keys can be regenerated after a factory reset.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Apply the Qualcomm firmware patch (distributed via device OEM/ODM) to ensure Keymaster rejects re-provisioning attempts after factory reset. Until patched, be aware that device identity attestation may not be trustworthy on affected devices.

Fix this in Kamorta Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing16.0 h
  • Review / QA8.0 h
34.0 hours of engineering $5,800
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-14089 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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