CVE-2019-15341
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus Android device with a build fingerprint of TECNO/H622/TECNO-ID3k:8.1.0/O11019/E-180914V83:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.lovelyfont.defcontainer (versionCode=7, versionName=7.0.11). This app contains an exported service named com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService that allows any app co-located on the device to supply the file path to a Dalvik Executable (DEX) file which it will dynamically load within its own process and execute in with its own system privileges. This app cannot be disabled by the user and the attack can be performed by a zero-permission app. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to video record the user's screen, factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), and obtains the user's text messages, and more. Executing code as the system user can allow a third-party app to factory reset the device, obtain the user's Wi-Fi passwords, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the GUI, change the default Input Method Editor (IME) (e.g., keyboard) with one contained within the attacking app that contains keylogging functionality, and obtains the user's text messages, and more.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA pre-installed platform app (com.lovelyfont.defcontainer v7.0.11) on Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus contains an exported service (FunctionService) that dynamically loads and executes arbitrary DEX files supplied by any co-located app, running with system-level privileges. This zero-permission vulnerability allows complete device compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelCheck if the device is a Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus by navigating to Settings > About Phone > Model Number, or run: `getprop ro.product.model` via ADB shellAffected if The device model matches Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus or variants (Camon IAir 2+)
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Verify vulnerable app is installedCheck if the package com.loughtyfont.defcontainer exists by running: `pm list packages | grep lovelyfont` or `dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer` via ADB shellAffected if The package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer is present on the device
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Check app versionRetrieve the version of the defcontainer app using: `dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer | grep versionName` via ADB shellAffected if The installed version is 7.0.11 or if the version cannot be determined but the package exists on a Camon iAir 2+ device (all versions are affected)
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Verify FunctionService is exportedCheck if the FunctionService is exported by running: `dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer | grep -A 10 FunctionService` via ADB shell and look for `android:exported="true"`Affected if The FunctionService component has android:exported set to true, allowing any app to send commands to it
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Confirm system-level privilegesVerify the app runs with elevated privileges by checking: `dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer | grep perm` and check if it holds system-level permissions or runs as a privileged system appAffected if The app holds system-level or privileged permissions, meaning any code executed through the vulnerable service runs with those elevated privileges
The device is affected if it is a Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus with the com.lovelyfont.defcontainer app present and its FunctionService exported, as this allows any installed app to execute code with system-level privileges.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThis is a firmware-level vulnerability in a pre-installed system app that cannot be disabled by users. Remediation requires the device manufacturer (Tecno) to issue a security firmware update that removes or secures the vulnerable service.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-15341 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-15341 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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