dbcve.org
Camon Iclick FirmwareOperating system · Tecno Mobile

CVE-2019-15345

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2019-11-14
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Tecno Camon iClick Android device with a build fingerprint of TECNO/H633/TECNO-IN6:8.1.0/O11019/A-180409V96:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.lovelyfont.defcontainer (versionCode=7, versionName=7.0.8). This app contains an exported service named com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService that allows any app co-located on the device to supply the file path to a Dalvik Executable (DEX) file which it will dynamically load within its own process and execute in with its own system privileges. This app cannot be disabled by the user and the attack can be performed by a zero-permission app. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to video record the user's screen, factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), and obtains the user's text messages, and more. Executing code as the system user can allow a third-party app to factory reset the device, obtain the user's Wi-Fi passwords, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the GUI, change the default Input Method Editor (IME) (e.g., keyboard) with one contained within the attacking app that contains keylogging functionality, and obtains the user's text messages, and more.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Tecno Camon iClick Android device ships with a pre-installed system app (com.lovelyfont.defcontainer) containing an exported service (com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService) that accepts file paths to Dalvik Executable (DEX) files and dynamically loads/executes them within its own process using system privileges. This allows any zero-permission app co-located on the device to achieve privilege escalation to system-level access.

MitigationUsers should check for and apply any available firmware/OTA updates from Tecno; the vulnerable pre-installed app cannot be disabled or uninstalled by end users, requiring a vendor-supplied patch to remove or properly secure the exported service.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Camon Iclick FirmwareOperating system
Affected:all versions

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify device model
    Run 'adb shell getprop ro.product.model' or check the device Settings > About Phone > Model number to confirm it is a Tecno Camon iClick
    Affected if Device model is Tecno Camon iClick or Camon Iclick
  2. Check for vulnerable app presence
    Run 'adb shell pm list packages | grep lovelyfont' or use an Android app analyzer to enumerate installed packages and look for com.lovelyfont.defcontainer
    Affected if Package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer is installed on the device
  3. Verify service is exported
    Run 'adb shell dumpsys package com.lovelyfont.defcontainer' and examine the AndroidManifest.xml declarations, or use 'adb shell service list' to check if com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService is listed as an exported service
    Affected if FunctionService is declared as exported in the app manifest and accessible to other apps
  4. Test service accessibility
    Attempt to bind to the service using 'adb shell service call com.lovelyfont.defcontainer/com.lovelyfont.manager.service.FunctionService' or use a tool like drozer to check if any app without special permissions can interact with it
    Affected if The service accepts commands or file paths from apps holding no special permissions

A user is affected if they use a Tecno Camon iClick device that has the com.lovelyfont.defcontainer app with an exported FunctionService that accepts untrusted DEX file paths from any local app.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Users should check for and apply any available firmware/OTA updates from Tecno; the vulnerable pre-installed app cannot be disabled or uninstalled by end users, requiring a vendor-supplied patch to remove or properly secure the exported service.

Fix this in Camon Iclick Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation6.0 h
  • Implementation12.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
25.0 hours of engineering $4,500
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,200.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-15345 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

Get it on GitHub Scan in the browser

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-15345 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data