CVE-2019-15469
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Xiaomi Mi Pad 4 Android device with a build fingerprint of Xiaomi/clover/clover:8.1.0/OPM1.171019.019/V9.6.26.0.ODJCNFD:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed app with a package name of com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement app (versionCode=27, versionName=8.1.0) that allows other pre-installed apps to perform microphone audio recording via an accessible app component. This capability can be accessed by any pre-installed app on the device which can obtain signatureOrSystem permissions that are required by other other pre-installed apps that export their capabilities to other pre-installed app. This app allows a third-party app to use its open interface to record telephone calls to external storage.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Xiaomi Mi Pad 4 contains a pre-installed app (com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement) with an exported component that permits microphone audio recording without proper access controls. This component can be invoked by any pre-installed app holding signatureOrSystem permissions, enabling unauthorized call recording to external storage.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the device model number in Settings > About Phone > Model Number, or run: getprop ro.product.modelAffected if The device is not a Xiaomi Mi Pad 4 (the affected product)
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Verify the vulnerable app is installedCheck if the package com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement exists by running: pm list packages | grep callenhancement, or use an app inspector to list installed packagesAffected if The package com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement is not present on the device (not vulnerable if absent)
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Inspect the app's exported componentDecompile the APK (typically at /system/app/CallEnhancement/CallEnhancement.apk or /data/app/...) and examine AndroidManifest.xml for an exported activity, service, or receiver that handles audio recordingAffected if An exported component with recording capability is declared in the manifest and android:exported=true is set
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Check app permissions grantedRun: dumpsys package com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement to view the requested and granted permissions, particularly INTERNET, RECORD_AUDIO, and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGEAffected if The app holds RECORD_AUDIO permission and the component is exported to other signatureOrSystem apps
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Verify third-party app access potentialList all pre-installed apps with signatureOrSystem permissions using: pm list packages -s --permissions | grep -i signatureOrSystem. Any such app could potentially invoke the vulnerable exported componentAffected if Other pre-installed apps hold signatureOrSystem permissions that would allow them to invoke the exported component
If the device is a Xiaomi Mi Pad 4 and the com.qualcomm.qti.callenhancement app is present with an exported component accessible to signatureOrSystem apps, the device is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataSince this is a pre-installed OEM app, organizations should apply vendor firmware updates when available, or implement Mobile Device Management (MDM) policies to restrict app permissions and block unauthorized microphone access.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-15469 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-15469 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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