CVE-2019-16650
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOn Supermicro X10 and X11 products, a client's access privileges may be transferred to a different client that later has the same socket file descriptor number. In opportunistic circumstances, an attacker can simply connect to the virtual media service, and then connect virtual USB devices to the server managed by the BMC.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a file descriptor handling vulnerability in Supermicro X10 and X11 BMCs. When a client disconnects from the virtual media service, the socket file descriptor is not properly cleared, allowing a subsequent client connection to inherit the previous client's access privileges. An attacker can exploit this by connecting to the virtual media service and then connecting virtual USB devices to the managed server using the leaked privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5= 1.71.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Supermicro BMC modelAccess the BMC web interface or use IPMI command 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> raw' to retrieve the system model information. Confirm it is one of the following: X11dai N, X11dac, X11dph Tq, X11dph I, X11dph T, X11dps Re, X11dsf E, or X11dsn Ts.Affected if The BMC model matches one of the listed X11 platforms.
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Check the BMC firmware versionIn the BMC web interface, navigate to the firmware version information page, or use IPMI command 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> mc info' to retrieve the firmware version.Affected if The firmware version is exactly 1.71.5.
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Verify virtual media service statusCheck if the virtual media service is enabled in the BMC configuration under IPMI or web interface settings. This is typically found in 'Remote Management' or 'Virtual Media' sections.Affected if The virtual media service is enabled and accessible on the BMC.
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Assess network exposure of the BMCDetermine if the BMC management interface is reachable from untrusted networks. Check firewall rules, VLAN configuration, or network ACLs restricting access to the BMC IP address on ports used for IPMI (typically 623/UDP for IPMI and 80/443 for web interface).Affected if The BMC is accessible from networks outside the trusted management network.
A user is affected if they are running one of the listed Supermicro X11 BMC models with firmware version 1.71.5 and the virtual media service is network-accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the latest Supermicro BMC firmware update for X10 and X11 platforms. If no update is available, restrict network access to the BMC management interface to trusted networks only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-16650 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-16650 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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