CVE-2019-1666
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the Graphite service of Cisco HyperFlex software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to retrieve data from the Graphite service. The vulnerability is due to insufficient authentication controls. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to the Graphite service. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to retrieve any statistics from the Graphite service. Versions prior to 3.5(2a) are affected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability exists in the Graphite service of Cisco HyperFlex software, where insufficient authentication controls allow unauthenticated remote attackers to retrieve arbitrary statistics by sending crafted requests to the service. This exposure enables an attacker to access sensitive performance and system metrics without any credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.6\(1a\)= 2.6\(1b\)= 2.6\(1d\)= 2.6\(1e\)= 3.0\(1a\)= 3.0\(1b\)= 3.0\(1c\)= 3.0\(1d\)= 3.0\(1e\)= 3.0\(1h\)= 3.0\(1i\)= 3.5\(1a\)CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify HyperFlex Hx Data Platform versionRun 'show version' on the HyperFlex cluster controller or check the HX Data Platform version via the HX Connect web interface under Cluster > InformationAffected if The installed version matches any of: 2.6(1a), 2.6(1b), 2.6(1d), 2.6(1e), 3.0(1a), 3.0(1b), 3.0(1c), 3.0(1d), 3.0(1e), 3.0(1h), 3.0(1i), 3.5(1a)
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Identify if Graphite service is enabledCheck for the Graphite service process listening on port 2003 (default Graphite plaintext) or port 2004 (Graphite pickle) by running 'netstat -an | grep -E "2003|2004"' or 'ss -tlnp | grep -E "2003|2004"' on HyperFlex nodesAffected if The Graphite service is listening and accessible on any network interface
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Check Graphite service network exposureVerify if port 2003/2004 is bound to all interfaces (0.0.0.0) rather than localhost only, and test external connectivity by attempting a telnet or nc connection to those ports from an untrusted network segmentAffected if The Graphite port is accessible from network segments outside the trusted management network
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Test Graphite unauthenticated accessSend a test metric retrieval request to the Graphite service using echo -e "test.metric 123 $(date +%s)" | nc -w 3 <target_ip> 2003 followed by a query to verify if metrics can be retrieved without authenticationAffected if Metrics can be retrieved or pushed without any authentication credentials
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Review firewall and ACL rules for Graphite portCheck iptables rules with 'iptables -L -n' or HyperFlex firewall configuration to determine if port 2003/2004 is explicitly blocked or allowed for external IPsAffected if No firewall rule blocks unauthenticated access to the Graphite service from untrusted networks
You are affected if your HyperFlex Hx Data Platform version is any of the listed versions AND the Graphite service is network-accessible without authentication controls.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Cisco HyperFlex to version 3.5(2a) or later to resolve the authentication deficiency. If immediate upgrading is not feasible, implement network segmentation or firewall rules to restrict unauthorized access to the Graphite service port.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1666 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1666 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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