OlingoApplication · Apache

CVE-2019-17555

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2019-12-04
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 4.6.0 or later.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The AsyncResponseWrapperImpl class in Apache Olingo versions 4.0.0 to 4.6.0 reads the Retry-After header and passes it to the Thread.sleep() method without any check. If a malicious server returns a huge value in the header, then it can help to implement a DoS attack.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The AsyncResponseWrapperImpl class in Apache Olingo 4.0.0-4.6.0 reads the Retry-After HTTP header from server responses and passes the value directly to Thread.sleep() without any validation or bounds checking. A malicious server can return an extremely large header value, causing the client thread to block for an extended period and resulting in denial of service.

MitigationUpgrade to Apache Olingo version 4.7.0 or later which implements proper validation of the Retry-After header value before passing it to Thread.sleep().

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
OlingoApplication
Affected:>= 4.0.0, <= 4.6.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Apache Olingo library version
    Inspect your project's dependency management file (pom.xml, build.gradle, or equivalent) for the Apache Olingo dependency version, or list the olingo-*.jar files in your classpath and check their versioned filenames.
    Affected if The version listed is between 4.0.0 and 4.6.0 inclusive.
  2. Locate the AsyncResponseWrapperImpl class in the classpath
    Search your deployed application libraries for a JAR file containing 'olingo' in the name and verify it includes the class 'org.apache.olingo.client.core.AsyncResponseWrapperImpl' or similar path containing 'AsyncResponseWrapperImpl'.
    Affected if This class exists in your runtime libraries and the version from step 1 is in the affected range.
  3. Determine if your application uses OData client operations
    Review application code for usage of ODataClient or related client classes (such as AsyncClient or DefaultODataClient) that perform HTTP requests to OData services.
    Affected if Your code uses Olingo client APIs to make outbound HTTP requests to OData services.
  4. Assess trust boundary of OData service endpoints
    Identify all OData service URLs your application connects to and determine whether they are trusted internal services or external/untrusted endpoints.
    Affected if Your application makes client requests to external or untrusted OData servers that could return malicious HTTP headers.

You are affected if your application uses Apache Olingo versions 4.0.0-4.6.0 and acts as an HTTP client connecting to OData services where a malicious server could supply an arbitrarily large Retry-After header value.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 4.6.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Apache Olingo version 4.7.0 or later which implements proper validation of the Retry-After header value before passing it to Thread.sleep().

Fix this in Olingo Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
9.0 hours of engineering $1,600
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,560.

Scan for this in your stack

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dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-17555 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data