CVE-2019-1764
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Software for Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack. The vulnerability is due to insufficient CSRF protections for the web-based management interface of an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by persuading an authenticated user of the interface to follow a crafted link. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform arbitrary actions on a targeted device via a web browser and with the privileges of the user. This vulnerability affects Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series products running a SIP Software release prior to 11.0(5) for Wireless IP Phone 8821 and 8821-EX; and 12.5(1)SR1 for the IP Conference Phone 8832 and the rest of the IP Phone 8800 Series. Cisco IP Conference Phone 8831 is not affected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series devices running SIP Software. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by tricking an authenticated user into clicking a malicious link, allowing arbitrary actions on the targeted device with the privileges of the compromised user.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 11.0\(5\)< 11.0\(5\)< 12.5\(1\)sr1< 12.5\(1\)sr1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify device modelAccess the phone's web interface or check the physical device label to confirm it is a Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series model (8821, 8821-EX, 8832, or other 8800 series variants).Affected if The device is not a Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series model (not affected).
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Check firmware versionLog into the web-based management interface and navigate to the version or status page to view the installed SIP firmware version. Compare it against the affected ranges: < 11.0(5) for 8821/8821-EX, and < 12.5(1)SR1 for 8832 and other 8800 Series models.Affected if The installed firmware version falls within the affected ranges listed.
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Verify web management interface is enabledAccess the phone's settings or administration menu and confirm whether the web-based management interface (HTTP/HTTPS) is enabled and accessible.Affected if The web interface is disabled (the exploit cannot be triggered).
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Check for active authenticated sessionsReview the web interface for any active administrator or user sessions currently logged in, as the CSRF attack requires a victim to have an active authenticated session.Affected if No users are currently authenticated to the web interface (the attack cannot succeed without an authenticated victim).
A user is affected if they have a Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series device (8821/8821-EX, 8832, or other 8800 models) running a firmware version below 11.0(5) or 12.5(1)SR1 respectively, with the web management interface enabled and active authenticated sessions present.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data11.012.5
Upgrade Cisco IP Phone 8800 Series devices to SIP Software version 11.0(5) or later for Wireless IP Phone 8821/8821-EX, and version 12.5(1)SR1 or later for IP Conference Phone 8832 and other 8800 Series models.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $9,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1764 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1764 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data