CVE-2019-1905
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the GZIP decompression engine of Cisco AsyncOS Software for Cisco Email Security Appliance (ESA) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass configured content filters on the device. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of GZIP-formatted files. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious file inside a crafted GZIP-compressed file. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured content filters that would normally drop the email.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe vulnerability exists in the GZIP decompression engine of Cisco Email Security Appliance (ESA) running AsyncOS software. The engine does not properly validate GZIP-formatted files, allowing an attacker to embed malicious file content inside a crafted GZIP archive that bypasses configured content filters designed to detect and drop dangerous attachments.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 11.1.2= 12.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device is a Cisco Email Security ApplianceLog into the ESA CLI or web interface and verify the device model is an Email Security Appliance. In the CLI, run 'show hardware' or check the web UI dashboard for the appliance type.Affected if The device is not a Cisco ESA (this CVE only affects ESA models).
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Check the AsyncOS versionIn the ESA CLI, run 'version' or 'show version' to display the installed AsyncOS software version. Alternatively, check the web UI under System Administration > Software Upgrade.Affected if The installed version is 11.1.2 or 12.0.0 specifically, or falls within the affected version range if additional versions are listed in the Cisco advisory.
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Verify content filters are configured for attachment detectionIn the ESA web UI, navigate to Mail Policies > Incoming Mail Policies or Outgoing Mail Policies. Check if any content filters are enabled that include attachment type conditions (such as 'attachment file type' or 'attachment name' rules). In CLI, use 'filters' command to list active filters.Affected if Content filters detecting dangerous attachment types are configured and enabled on incoming or outgoing mail policies.
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Confirm GZIP-compressed attachments are being processedReview the content filter conditions to see if they evaluate attachment content after decompression. Check if GZIP archives are being accepted and decompressed by the ESA. Use ' TRACE' or 'policy' debug commands to observe how GZIP attachments are being handled by the filter engine.Affected if The ESA is decompressing GZIP attachments and applying content filters to the decompressed content, as this is the vulnerable code path.
The environment is affected if the device is a Cisco ESA running AsyncOS version 11.1.2 or 12.0.0 (or an affected version range) with content filters configured to detect dangerous attachments, and the ESA is processing GZIP-compressed files through those filters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the relevant Cisco security patch for CVE-2019-1905 to the AsyncOS software. No configuration-based workarounds are mentioned in the advisory; upgrading to a fixed AsyncOS version is the primary remediation.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-1905 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-1905 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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