CVE-2019-19741
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedElectronic Arts Origin 10.5.55.33574 is vulnerable to local privilege escalation due to arbitrary directory DACL manipulation, a different issue than CVE-2019-19247 and CVE-2019-19248. When Origin.exe connects to the named pipe OriginClientService, the privileged service verifies the client's executable file instead of its in-memory process (which can be significantly different from the executable file due to, for example, DLL injection). Data transmitted over the pipe is encrypted using a static key. Instead of hooking the pipe communication directly via WriteFileEx(), this can be bypassed by hooking the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function of libeay32.dll. The pipe takes the command CreateDirectory to create a directory and adjust the directory DACL. Calls to this function can be intercepted, the directory and the DACL can be replaced, and the manipulated DACL is written. Arbitrary DACL write is further achieved by creating a hardlink in a user-controlled directory that points to (for example) a service binary. The DACL is then written to this service binary, which results in escalation of privileges.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceEA Origin client contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability where the OriginClientService named pipe verifies the client's executable file rather than its in-memory process, allowing DLL injection to bypass verification. An attacker can intercept pipe communications by hooking EVP_EncryptUpdate() in libeay32.dll, manipulate CreateDirectory commands to write arbitrary DACLs to any file via hardlinks (e.g., service binaries), achieving SYSTEM privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 10.5.56.33908CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if EA Origin is installedSearch for Origin installation directories: C:\Program Files\Origin Games, C:\Program Files (x86)\Origin, or check registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Electronic Arts\OriginAffected if EA Origin is found installed on the system
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Identify installed Origin versionCheck version of Origin.exe in the installation directory via Properties > Details, or use PowerShell: Get-Item 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Origin\Origin.exe' | Select-Object VersionInfoAffected if Version is present and less than 10.5.56.33908 (vulnerable if no patch applied)
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Check if OriginClientService is runningOpen Services console (services.msc) and look for 'OriginClientService', or run: Get-Service -Name '*Origin*' in PowerShellAffected if OriginClientService is present and running on the system
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Verify named pipe accessibilityCheck for existence of OriginClientService named pipe using PowerShell: Get-ChildItem \\.\pipe\ | Where-Object {$_.Name -like '*Origin*'}Affected if The OriginClientService named pipe exists and is accessible to standard users
A system is affected if EA Origin is installed with version lower than 10.5.56.33908 and the OriginClientService named pipe is present and accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data10.5.56.33908
Apply vendor patches from Electronic Arts for Origin client; until patched, consider restricting or disabling the OriginClientService named pipe or removing the vulnerable Origin software from systems where high privilege isolation is required.
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- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-19741 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-19741 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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