CVE-2019-5672
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNVIDIA Jetson TX1 and TX2 contain a vulnerability in the Linux for Tegra (L4T) operating system (on all versions prior to R28.3) where the Secure Shell (SSH) keys provided in the sample rootfs are not replaced by unique host keys after sample rootsfs generation and flashing, which may lead to information disclosure.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceNVIDIA Jetson TX1 and TX2 devices running Linux for Tegra (L4T) versions prior to R28.3 ship with sample SSH host keys that are not regenerated during the flashing process. All devices deployed with affected images contain identical SSH host keys, allowing attackers who obtain these keys to perform man-in-the-middle attacks or impersonate devices on the network.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< r28.3< r28.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check L4T version on the Jetson deviceRun 'head -n 1 /etc/nv_tegra_release' or 'cat /etc/nv_tegra_release' to display the L4T version string. The version appears as 'Release X.Y (build number)' where X.Y is the L4T release.Affected if The displayed version is earlier than R28.3 (for example, R28.1, R28.2)
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Verify SSH service is enabled and host keys existRun 'ls -la /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*' to list the SSH host key files. Check that the four standard host key files exist: ssh_host_rsa_key, ssh_host_ecdsa_key, ssh_host_ed25519_key, and their corresponding .pub files.Affected if SSH host key files exist on the device
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Compare SSH host keys to known default valuesView the content of each host key with 'cat /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' and compare the key fingerprint or modulus to known default values, or manually compare keys across multiple deployed Jetson devices using 'ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key'Affected if The host keys are identical to keys on other Jetson devices or match known sample keys shipped with L4T images prior to R28.3
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Check if host keys were regenerated after flashRun 'stat /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' to check the file modification timestamp. Compare this to the approximate time the device was flashed. Keys generated during initial flashing would have timestamps close to the system installation date.Affected if Host key creation timestamps predate any post-flash key regeneration attempts or the device has never had keys regenerated
The device is affected if it runs L4T version prior to R28.3 AND contains SSH host keys that are identical to default/sample keys or identical across multiple devices.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedGenerate unique SSH host keys on each device after flashing using ssh-keygen or upgrade to L4T R28.3 or later which replaces default keys with unique ones during the flashing process.
L4T R28.3
- Download the L4T R28.3 (or later) release package from NVIDIA's Jetson developer website
- Extract the L4T release package on the host system
- Connect the Jetson TX1 or TX2 device to the host in recovery mode
- Run the standard L4T flashing script (e.g., sudo ./flash.sh <target_board> jetson-tx1 or jetson-tx2) to flash the device with the updated software
- After flashing completes, boot the device to verify the new OS is running
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-5672 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-5672 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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