Api ManagerApplication · Wso2

CVE-2019-6513

MEDIUM · 5.4 CVSS v3.0 Published 2019-05-21
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
60/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
An issue was discovered in WSO2 API Manager 2.6.0. It is possible for a logged-in user to upload, as API documentation, any type of file by changing the extension to an allowed one.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

In WSO2 API Manager 2.6.0, the documentation upload feature only validates file extensions rather than actual file content. An authenticated user can bypass this control by renaming a malicious file (e.g., .php, .exe) to have an allowed extension like .txt or .pdf. This allows upload of potentially executable or malicious files that could lead to remote code execution or stored XSS.

MitigationImplement server-side validation using magic byte/file signature verification and strict allowlists for permitted file types; store uploads outside the webroot and serve them with proper content-type headers.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Api ManagerApplication
Affected:= 2.6.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm WSO2 API Manager version
    Check the installed WSO2 API Manager version through the management console or product documentation. Typically accessible via https://<host>:9443/carbon or by reviewing product installation metadata.
    Affected if The installed version is WSO2 API Manager 2.6.0 exactly.
  2. Verify documentation upload feature is accessible
    Log in to the API Manager as an authenticated user with documentation upload privileges. Navigate to the API documentation section where file upload is available.
    Affected if The documentation upload functionality is enabled and accessible to authenticated users.
  3. Inspect file upload validation mechanism
    Review the upload handling code or configuration for the documentation feature. Look for validation logic that checks only file extensions (.txt, .pdf) without inspecting file content, magic bytes, or MIME type.
    Affected if The upload validation relies solely on file extension checking without content-type or magic byte verification.
  4. Check uploaded file storage location
    Locate where uploaded documentation files are stored on the server filesystem. Determine if they are placed within the webroot or a publicly accessible directory.
    Affected if Uploaded files are stored within the webroot or a directory reachable via HTTP/HTTPS, making them potentially executable.

You are affected if you are running WSO2 API Manager 2.6.0 with the documentation upload feature accessible to authenticated users, and the upload validation does not inspect actual file content.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Implement server-side validation using magic byte/file signature verification and strict allowlists for permitted file types; store uploads outside the webroot and serve them with proper content-type headers.

Fix this in Api Manager Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
15.0 hours of engineering $2,640
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-6513 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data