CVE-2019-6837
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): CWE-918 vulnerability exists in U.motion Server (MEG6501-0001 - U.motion KNX server, MEG6501-0002 - U.motion KNX Server Plus, MEG6260-0410 - U.motion KNX Server Plus, Touch 10, MEG6260-0415 - U.motion KNX Server Plus, Touch 15), which could cause server configuration data to be exposed when an attacker modifies a URL.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CWE-918) in U.motion Server allows remote attackers to modify URLs processed by the server, causing sensitive server configuration data to be exposed. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied URL parameters.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.3.7< 1.3.7< 1.3.7< 1.3.7CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the U.motion device modelAccess the device web interface or check the device label to determine if the model is Meg6501 or Meg6260. Look for model numbers Meg6501 (0001 or 0002) or Meg6260 (0410 or 0415).Affected if The device model matches one of the affected variants: Meg6501 0001, Meg6501 0002, Meg6260 0410, or Meg6260 0415.
-
Determine the installed firmware versionLog into the U.motion Server web interface and navigate to the System or About section to view the firmware version. Alternatively, check via the device's administrative console or SNMP if available.Affected if The firmware version is lower than 1.3.7.
-
Verify remote access is enabledCheck the U.motion Server configuration settings for remote/network access features. Look for web server settings, API endpoints, or any feature that allows external URL processing.Affected if Remote access or web interface is exposed and the vulnerable URL handling functionality is accessible.
-
Check for URL-based input fieldsExamine the U.motion Server web interface for any fields or parameters that accept URLs, such as external resource links, webhook configurations, or integration settings.Affected if The server has input fields that accept user-supplied URLs that get processed by the server.
The environment is affected if the device is a Schneider Electric Meg6501 or Meg6260 model with firmware version below 1.3.7 and the web interface with URL processing features is accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.3.7
Implement strict allowlist-based URL validation and restrict the protocols and domains the server is permitted to fetch. Additionally, apply network segmentation to limit the impact of potential SSRF exploitation.
Firmware version 1.3.7 or later for Meg6501 and Meg6260 series devices
- Identify the specific U.motion device model (MEG6501-0001, MEG6501-0002, MEG6260-0410, or MEG6260-0415) in your environment
- Access the device administrative interface or management console
- Locate the firmware upgrade section in the device settings
- Obtain the firmware version 1.3.7 or later from the official Schneider Electric website or support portal
- Upload and apply the new firmware version following the vendor's documented upgrade procedure
- After upgrade, verify the firmware version has been successfully updated
- Verify the vulnerability is resolved by confirming the device responds correctly to requests
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2019-6837 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2019-6837 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data