CVE-2020-0366
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn PackageInstaller, there is a possible permissions bypass due to a tapjacking vulnerability. This could lead to local escalation of privilege using an app set as the default Assist app with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11Android ID: A-138443815
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a tapjacking vulnerability in Android's PackageInstaller component (Android-11) that allows a malicious app to overlay legitimate UI elements and trick users into granting permissions they didn't intend to. The attack requires the victim to have set a malicious app as the default Assist app and requires user interaction to succeed.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 11.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Android version is exactly 11.0Go to Settings > About Phone > Android version and verify the version number displays exactly 11.0Affected if The device runs Android 11.0 (not 11.0 with later patch updates)
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Identify the default Assist appGo to Settings > Apps > Default apps > Assist app (or Settings > Apps & notifications > Default apps > Assist app) and note which app is selected as the default AssistantAffected if A non-trusted or unknown application is set as the default Assistant/Assist app
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Verify the Assist app permissionsGo to Settings > Apps > [Assist app name] > Permissions and review what permissions the Assistant app has been grantedAffected if The Assist app has extensive permissions that could be exploited if it were malicious
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Confirm Assist app is from a trusted sourceCheck the Assist app package details in Settings > Apps > [Assist app name] and verify it was downloaded from a trusted source such as Google Play or pre-installed by the device manufacturerAffected if The Assist app is from an untrusted or unknown source
A device is affected if it runs Android 11.0 (without the June 2020 security patch or later) AND has an untrusted app set as the default Assistant
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the Android-11 security update (2020-06-05 or later patch level) from your device manufacturer to receive the platform-level fix for PackageInstaller.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-0366 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-0366 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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