CVE-2020-10065
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMissing Size Checks in Bluetooth HCI over SPI. Zephyr versions >= v1.14.2, >= v2.2.0 contain Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency (CWE-130). For more information, see https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-hg2w-62p6-g67c
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Zephyr RTOS Bluetooth HCI driver for SPI lacks proper size validation when processing incoming data packets. This improper handling of length parameter inconsistency (CWE-130) in the SPI communication path could allow an attacker to trigger buffer overflows or memory corruption by sending specially crafted HCI packets with malformed length fields.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.14.2>= 2.0.0, <= 2.2.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Zephyr version in useCheck the Zephyr kernel version at runtime via kERNEL_VERSION or in the build configuration (CONFIG_ZEPHYR_VERSION or zephyr_version in CMakeLists.txt or dts). Compare against affected ranges: <=1.14.2 or >=2.0.0 through <=2.2.0Affected if The installed Zephyr version falls within <=1.14.2 or >=2.0.0 to <=2.2.0
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Confirm Bluetooth HCI SPI driver is enabledInspect the build configuration for CONFIG_BT_HCI (Bluetooth HCI) and CONFIG_BT_SPI (Bluetooth HCI over SPI) set to y. Check device tree for an SPI node with a Bluetooth HCI compatible propertyAffected if CONFIG_BT_SPI is enabled and the device tree contains an SPI-connected Bluetooth device using the HCI driver
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Verify SPI HCI packet handling code is presentLocate and examine the file drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_spi.c (or equivalent path in the codebase). Search for the function handling incoming HCI packet data, specifically the length field parsing logicAffected if The SPI HCI driver source file exists and processes incoming packets without validating the length field against buffer bounds
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Check for length field validation in HCI SPI handlerReview the code that reads the HCI packet header from SPI (typically the first 3 bytes containing packet indicator and length). Look for bounds checking logic before copying data into fixed-size buffersAffected if The code copies data based on the length field from the SPI packet without verifying it does not exceed the destination buffer size (CWE-130)
You are affected if your Zephyr version is 1.14.2 or earlier, or between 2.0.0 and 2.2.0, AND the Bluetooth HCI over SPI driver is enabled with the vulnerable length validation code present.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Zephyr to a version containing the fix (v1.14.3+, v2.3.0+). Alternatively, implement input validation for all SPI HCI packet length fields before processing.
Zephyr v2.3.0 (or v1.14.3 for the 1.x branch)
- 1. Identify your current Zephyr version using your build system or manifest file
- 2. Update your Zephyr manifest or repository to reference Zephyr v2.3.0 or later (or v1.14.3 if remaining on the 1.x branch)
- 3. Regenerate your build configuration by cleaning and re-running cmake
- 4. Rebuild your application with the updated Zephyr version
- 5. Verify the Bluetooth HCI over SPI functionality works correctly with the new version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,096.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10065 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10065 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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