CVE-2020-10125
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNCR SelfServ ATMs running APTRA XFS 04.02.01 and 05.01.00 implement 512-bit RSA certificates to validate bunch note acceptor (BNA) software updates, which can be broken by an attacker with physical access in a sufficiently short period of time, thereby enabling the attacker to sign arbitrary files and CAB archives used to update BNA software, as well as bypass application whitelisting, resulting in the ability to execute arbitrary code.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceNCR SelfServ ATMs running APTRA XFS versions 04.02.01 and 05.01.00 use 512-bit RSA certificates to validate bunch note acceptor (BNA) software updates. This key size is cryptographically weak and can be broken by an attacker with physical access, allowing them to sign malicious CAB archives and arbitrary files to bypass application whitelisting and execute arbitrary code on the ATM.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 04.02.01= 05.01.00CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the APTRA XFS version installedAccess the ATM system information or XFS configuration to retrieve the exact version number of the NCR APTRA XFS softwareAffected if The version is exactly 04.02.01 or 05.01.00
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Confirm the ATM is a NCR SelfServ modelCheck the ATM hardware model identification through system inventory or ATM management interfaceAffected if The ATM is a NCR SelfServ model running the affected APTRA XFS versions
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Locate the BNA certificate configurationExamine the certificate configuration files or settings used by the Bunch Note Acceptor (BNA) software update mechanismAffected if A 512-bit RSA key is used to validate BNA software update CAB archives
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Verify the RSA key size used for BNA updatesInspect the certificate or cryptographic key associated with the BNA update validation process to determine the key length in bitsAffected if The certificate uses a 512-bit RSA key rather than 2048 bits or greater
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Check if BNA software update feature is enabledReview the ATM configuration to determine if the Bunch Note Acceptor update functionality is activeAffected if BNA updates are enabled and the system uses the weak 512-bit RSA certificate for validation
A defender is affected if their NCR SelfServ ATM runs APTRA XFS version 04.02.01 or 05.01.00 with 512-bit RSA certificates configured for BNA software update validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to RSA certificates with key sizes of 2048 bits or greater, and ensure the certificate validation chain is properly enforced. Consider implementing additional physical security controls to limit access to the BNA update interface.
- Consultation12.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $16,896.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10125 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10125 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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