CVE-2020-10134
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPairing in Bluetooth® Core v5.2 and earlier may permit an unauthenticated attacker to acquire credentials with two pairing devices via adjacent access when the unauthenticated user initiates different pairing methods in each peer device and an end-user erroneously completes both pairing procedures with the MITM using the confirmation number of one peer as the passkey of the other. An adjacent, unauthenticated attacker could be able to initiate any Bluetooth operation on either attacked device exposed by the enabled Bluetooth profiles. This exposure may be limited when the user must authorize certain access explicitly, but so long as a user assumes that it is the intended remote device requesting permissions, device-local protections may be weakened.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis is a Bluetooth MITM pairing vulnerability where an unauthenticated adjacent attacker can manipulate the pairing process by initiating different pairing methods on each peer device and tricking users into confirming mismatched passkeys/confirmation numbers. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to intercept the pairing and gain access to Bluetooth operations exposed by enabled profiles.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 5.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your Bluetooth stack versionOn Linux, use 'hcitool -v' or check '/usr/bin/bluetoothctl --version'. On Windows, run 'bluetoothinfo.exe' or check in Device Manager under Bluetooth radio properties. On macOS, check System Report > Bluetooth for the LMP version.Affected if The Bluetooth implementation version is 5.2 or earlier, or if the version cannot be determined and is assumed to be legacy.
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Verify Bluetooth is enabledOn Linux: 'rfkill list' or 'hciconfig'. On Windows: Check Settings > Devices > Bluetooth. On macOS: Check System Preferences > Bluetooth.Affected if Bluetooth is powered on and available for pairing - the vulnerability only applies when devices are in pairing mode.
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Check if Secure Connections pairing is enforcedOn Linux, examine /etc/bluetooth/main.conf for 'SecureConnections' setting. On Windows, check Group Policy under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Bluetooth. On Android, check Developer Options for 'Secure Bluetooth'.Affected if Secure Connections (Bluetooth 4.2 and above) is disabled or not supported, allowing legacy pairing methods that are vulnerable to MITM.
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Identify the LMP (Link Manager Protocol) versionOn Linux, run 'hcitool le0' or 'hcitool info' to see LMP version. On Windows, use 'bthprops.cpl' to view details. The LMP version indicates the actual Bluetooth controller capabilities.Affected if LMP version is 9 or lower (corresponding to Bluetooth 5.2 or earlier), indicating the controller does not have the specification fix.
You are affected if your Bluetooth implementation version is 5.2 or earlier AND Bluetooth is actively enabled for pairing, especially if Secure Connections is not enforced.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate Bluetooth implementations to versions that address this vulnerability (post-v5.2 or vendor patches) and ensure users verify confirmation numbers match on both devices during pairing.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,096.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10134 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10134 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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