CVE-2020-10282
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMAVLink 1.0 protocol lacks any authentication or authorization mechanism, enabling identity spoofing, unauthorized command injection, and man-in-the-middle attacks on UAV communication links. MAVLink 2.0 provides optional HMAC-based packet signing but relies on a shared symmetric key across all network devices, creating a single point of failure where compromise of one device/key compromises the entire system's authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the installed MAVLink library versionCheck your project's dependency list, package manager, or source code for the Dronecode MAVLink library version number. Common locations: package.json, requirements.txt, vendor directory, or CMakeLists.txtAffected if The version is exactly 1.0.0 ( Dronecode Micro Air Vehicle Link )
-
Verify the MAVLink protocol version in useInspect your drone communication code or configuration files to determine whether the system is using MAVLink protocol version 1.0 or 2.0. Look for protocol version constants, headers (e.g., MAVLINK_VERSION), or runtime protocol negotiation logsAffected if The system explicitly uses MAVLink 1.0 protocol for UAV communications
-
Check if HMAC packet signing is enabledExamine your MAVLink configuration files or source code for MAVLink 2.0 signing settings. Look for MAVLINK_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN, MAVLINK_SIGNING_FLAG, or signing-related configuration structuresAffected if HMAC-based packet signing is not enabled or not configured for MAVLink 2.0 communications
-
Review the authentication key management setupInspect your system for symmetric key configuration files, key storage mechanisms, or key distribution logs related to MAVLink authenticationAffected if A single shared symmetric key is used across multiple network devices without additional authentication layers
You are affected if your system runs Dronecode MAVLink version 1.0.0, or uses MAVLink 1.0 protocol, or uses MAVLink 2.0 without enabled HMAC signing or with a single shared key across all devices.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to MAVLink 2.0 with cryptographic authentication enabled; implement robust key management and distribution practices; network-segment the MAVLink communication from untrusted networks; consider additional application-layer authentication for safety-critical operations.
MAVLink 2.0 or later (with packet signing enabled)
- Upgrade MAVLink library/implementation from version 1.0.0 to version 2.0 or later
- If using MAVLink 2.0, enable packet signing/encryption for authentication
- Implement a consistent symmetric key (HMAC) across all devices in the network
- Ensure all devices in the MAVLink network support and enforce authentication
- Verify that authentication is required and enforced for all MAVLink connections
- Rotate keys immediately if any device in the network is suspected to be compromised
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $15,616.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10282 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10282 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data