CVE-2020-10755
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn insecure-credentials flaw was found in all openstack-cinder versions before openstack-cinder 14.1.0, all openstack-cinder 15.x.x versions before openstack-cinder 15.2.0 and all openstack-cinder 16.x.x versions before openstack-cinder 16.1.0. When using openstack-cinder with the Dell EMC ScaleIO or VxFlex OS backend storage driver, credentials for the entire backend are exposed in the ``connection_info`` element in all Block Storage v3 Attachments API calls containing that element. This flaw enables an end-user to create a volume, make an API call to show the attachment detail information, and retrieve a username and password that may be used to connect to another user's volume. Additionally, these credentials are valid for the ScaleIO or VxFlex OS Management API, should an attacker discover the Management API endpoint. Source: OpenStack project
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceInsecure credential exposure in OpenStack Cinder when using Dell EMC ScaleIO or VxFlex OS backend storage drivers. Credentials are exposed in plaintext within the connection_info element in Block Storage v3 Attachments API responses, allowing any authenticated user to retrieve backend management credentials valid for both data and management plane access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 14.1.0>= 15.0.0, < 15.2.0>= 16.0.0, < 16.1.0= 18.04= 20.04CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check OpenStack Cinder versionRun 'cinder --version' or query the package: 'rpm -q openstack-cinder' (RHEL) or 'dpkg -l openstack-cinder' (Ubuntu)Affected if Version is < 14.1.0 OR >= 15.0.0 AND < 15.2.0 OR >= 16.0.0 AND < 16.1.0
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Identify configured storage backendsInspect /etc/cinder/cinder.conf and search for 'scaleio' or 'vxflexos' under the [DEFAULT] enabled_backends setting or in any backend sectionAffected if ScaleIO or VxFlex OS backend is listed in enabled_backends
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Verify driver configuration existsSearch cinder.conf for sections starting with '[scaleio]' or '[vxflexos]' containing 'volume_driver' pointing to cinder.volume.drivers.dell_emc.scaleio.ScaleIODriver or cinder.volume.drivers.dell_emc.vxflexos.VxFlexOSDriverAffected if Either ScaleIO or VxFlex OS volume driver is configured
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Test Block Storage v3 Attachments API for credential exposureUse openstack CLI: 'openstack volume attachment show <volume_id>' or query the Cinder API endpoint /v3/{project_id}/attachments/{attachment_id} and inspect the connection_info fieldAffected if The response contains plaintext 'password', 'user_name', 'san_ip', or 'management_ip' fields within the connection_info element
Cinder is vulnerable if the version falls within the affected ranges AND ScaleIO or VxFlex OS backend is configured, allowing any authenticated user to retrieve plaintext credentials via the Attachments API.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data14.1.015.2.016.1.0
Upgrade openstack-cinder to version 14.1.0, 15.2.0, or 16.1.0 or later. Additionally, rotate all ScaleIO/VxFlex OS credentials that may have been exposed, as they remain valid for the management API.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-10755 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-10755 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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