CVE-2020-11221
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUsage of syscall by non-secure entity can allow extraction of secure QTEE diagnostic information in clear text form due to insufficient checks in the syscall handler and leads to information disclosure in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA syscall handler in Qualcomm processors fails to properly validate whether a calling entity has sufficient privileges to access QTEE (Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment) diagnostic data. This allows non-secure or unprivileged entities to use syscalls to extract sensitive diagnostic information from the secure QTEE in plaintext form due to insufficient authorization checks.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Qualcomm chipset modelCheck /proc/cpuinfo, or run 'lspci -v' on embedded devices, or check device/system information via 'getprop' on Android devices. Look for Apq8009, Apq8009w, Apq8017, Apq8037, Apq8053, Apq8084, Aqt1000, or Apq8096au identifiers.Affected if The chipset model matches one of the affected variants: Apq8009, Apq8009w, Apq8017, Apq8037, Apq8053, Apq8084, Aqt1000, or Apq8096au.
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Determine the firmware versionQuery the baseband or firmware version through device-specific interfaces. On Android, use 'getprop' to check ro.build.version.all_codenames, ro.mediatek.version.release, or vendor-specific properties. Check /sys/firmware/attestation for version strings if accessible.Affected if The firmware version corresponds to one of the affected products listed in the CVE (all versions of the specified firmware variants).
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Verify QTEE diagnostic syscall availabilityCheck if the QTEE diagnostic interface is exposed. Look for /dev/tee* or /dev/qtee* device nodes. On Android, enumerate TEE drivers via 'ls -la /dev/tee*' and check for diagnostic-related syscalls in /proc/ or /sys/kernel/debug/.Affected if The QTEE diagnostic device nodes or syscalls are present and accessible to non-secure or unprivileged callers.
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Test for unprivileged access to TEE diagnosticsAttempt to access TEE diagnostic interfaces from a non-privileged context. Check if unprivileged users or applications can invoke syscalls related to QTEE diagnostics (look for SGX/TEE diagnostic calls in /proc/syscall or trace with strace).Affected if Unprivileged or non-secure entities can successfully invoke QTEE diagnostic syscalls without authorization failures.
The device is affected if it uses one of the listed Qualcomm chipset firmware variants (Apq8009, Apq8009w, Apq8017, Apq8037, Apq8053, Apq8084, Aqt1000, or Apq8096au) and the QTEE diagnostic syscall interface is accessible to unprivileged callers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-provided firmware/microcode updates for affected Snapdragon chipsets; contact Qualcomm and device OEMs for applicable patches. This is a hardware/firmware-level issue requiring updates from the chipset vendor and downstream device manufacturers.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-11221 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-11221 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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