CVE-2020-12510
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe default installation path of the TwinCAT XAR 3.1 software in all versions is underneath C:\TwinCAT. If the directory does not exist it and further subdirectories are created with permissions which allow every local user to modify the content. The default installation registers TcSysUI.exe for automatic execution upon log in of a user. If a less privileged user has a local account he or she can replace TcSysUI.exe. It will be executed automatically by another user during login. This is also true for users with administrative access. Consequently, a less privileged user can trick a higher privileged user into executing code he or she modified this way. By default Beckhoff’s IPCs are shipped with TwinCAT software installed this way and with just a single local user configured. Thus the vulnerability exists if further less privileged users have been added.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe TwinCAT XAR 3.1 installer creates the C:\TwinCAT directory with overly permissive access controls allowing all local users to modify contents. The TcSysUI.exe auto-start executable can be replaced by a less privileged user, enabling code execution with the privileges of any subsequent user who logs in.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Verify TwinCAT XAR 3.1 installationCheck if Beckhoff TwinCAT Extended Automation Runtime version 3.1 is installed on the system by reviewing installed programs in Control Panel or using: Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Where-Object {$_.DisplayName -like '*TwinCAT*'}Affected if TwinCAT XAR 3.1 is installed and the directory C:\TwinCAT exists on the system
-
Confirm C:\TwinCAT directory existsVerify that the C:\TwinCAT directory exists on the system by running: Test-Path C:\TwinCATAffected if The C:\TwinCAT directory exists on the system
-
Inspect access control permissions on C:\TwinCATCheck the permissions on the C:\TwinCAT directory using: Get-Acl C:\TwinCAT | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | Format-Table -AutoSize. Look for entries granting Write or Modify permissions to the Users group or Everyone.Affected if The permissions allow non-administrative users (such as Users group or Everyone) to Write or Modify files in C:\TwinCAT
-
Locate TcSysUI.exe auto-start executableFind the TcSysUI.exe file by running: Get-ChildItem C:\TwinCAT -Recurse -Filter TcSysUI.exe -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue. Also check auto-start locations in the registry: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunAffected if The TcSysUI.exe file exists in the C:\TwinCAT directory or is configured to auto-start
-
Verify write access to TcSysUI.exe for standard usersAttempt to verify if a standard (non-privileged) user account can modify or replace the TcSysUI.exe file. This can be done by reviewing the file permissions on the executable itself using: Get-Acl C:\TwinCAT\*\TcSysUI.exe | Select-Object -ExpandProperty AccessAffected if Standard users have Write or Modify permissions to the TcSysUI.exe file, allowing them to replace it with a malicious executable
A user is affected if TwinCAT XAR 3.1 is installed with the C:\TwinCAT directory having overly permissive access controls that allow standard users to modify the TcSysUI.exe auto-start executable.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict directory permissions on C:\TwinCAT to administrators only and disable or secure the TcSysUI.exe auto-start entry to prevent unauthorized modification by non-privileged users.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-12510 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-12510 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data