CVE-2020-12731
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe MagicMotion Flamingo 2 application for Android stores data on an sdcard under com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures, whence it can be read by other applications.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe MagicMotion Flamingo 2 Android application stores picture data in an unprotected location on the SD card (com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures). Because Android's storage model allows any application with storage permissions to read from the SD card, this enables unauthorized data access by malicious or unintended applications.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if MagicMotion Flamingo 2 app is installedUse a file manager or ADB command 'pm list packages' to search for package names containing 'magicmotion' or 'vt.magicmotion'. Alternatively, check installed applications on the Android device for 'MagicMotion Flamingo 2'.Affected if The application is installed on the device.
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Locate the vulnerable storage directoryNavigate to the SD card root directory and check for the path /storage/emulated/0/com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures (or /sdcard/com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures on older Android versions). Use ADB command 'ls -la /sdcard/com.vt.magicmotion/files/' or a file explorer app.Affected if The directory com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures exists on the external storage.
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Verify picture data exists in the vulnerable locationList the contents of the Pictures directory found in step 2. Check for image files (JPG, PNG, etc.) stored there. Use command 'ls /sdcard/com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures/' or inspect via file explorer.Affected if Image files are present in the com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures directory on external storage.
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Confirm storage permissions enable unauthorized accessCheck if the application has requested and been granted storage permissions (READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE or WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE). On Android 10 and below, any app with storage permissions can read from the SD card location. Use 'dumpsys package com.vt.magicmotion' to inspect granted permissions.Affected if The application holds storage permissions and other applications on the device also hold storage permissions.
A user is affected if the MagicMotion Flamingo 2 application is installed and picture data is stored in the unprotected SD card path com.vt.magicmotion/files/Pictures, which can be accessed by any other app with storage permissions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThe application should be modified to store sensitive data in app-private internal storage (getFilesDir()) or use Android's encrypted storage APIs (EncryptedFile or EncryptedSharedPreferences) instead of the external SD card path.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-12731 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-12731 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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