CVE-2020-13702
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Apple/Google Exposure Notification API's Rolling Proximity Identifier contains a secondary static temporary UID that persists beyond the rotating primary identifier. This allows attackers with Bluetooth LE access (via Beacon or IoT networks) to track individual device movement by correlating the static secondary UID, effectively bypassing the Bluetooth Smart Privacy protections designed into the system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2020-05-29CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if your app implements Exposure NotificationReview your mobile application's codebase and dependencies to determine if it integrates the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API (also known as GAEN or EN API). Check for imports of frameworks such as ExposureNotification in iOS or the COVID-19 Exposure Notifications system in Android.Affected if Your application integrates the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API for contact tracing functionality.
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Determine your Exposure Notification library versionCheck the version of the Exposure Notification SDK or framework bundled with your application. In iOS, inspect the ExposureNotification framework version. In Android, check the play-services-safetynet or exposure-notification library version in your build dependencies.Affected if The bundled library or framework version predates the 2020-05-29 patch.
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Verify your app build dateCheck the compilation or release date of your deployed mobile application binary. Examine the build metadata or the date when the app package (IPA/APK) was generated.Affected if The application was built or released prior to late May 2020, before the rolling proximity identifier fix was deployed.
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Check mobile OS version supportVerify that the mobile operating system versions your app targets support the corrected Exposure Notification implementation. iOS should be version 13.5 or later; Android should have Google Play Services version 20.x or later that includes the patched EN API.Affected if Your app runs on or targets mobile OS versions that do not include the patched Exposure Notification system.
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Inspect for custom implementationsIf you developed a custom contact tracing implementation that replicates the Apple/Google API behavior, review your code to determine if it generates separate rotating and static identifiers. Check whether your implementation creates a secondary UID that remains constant while the primary proximity identifier rotates.Affected if Your custom implementation replicates the vulnerable beta behavior with a persistent static secondary UID.
Your environment is affected if your mobile application or custom implementation uses the Exposure Notification API or a replica thereof from before the 2020-05-29 patch, or runs on mobile OS versions that lack the patched API support.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate to the patched version of the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API (post-2020-05-29) and ensure mobile OS versions support the corrected implementation. Review any custom implementations that may have replicated the vulnerable beta behavior.
- Navigate to the Google exposure-notifications-internals repository at github.com/google/exposure-notifications-internals
- Locate and review commit 8f751a666697 which addresses the secondary temporary UID vulnerability
- Analyze the code changes in the commit to understand the fix for the Rolling Proximity Identifier
- Apply the equivalent fix to your implementation of the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API
- Verify that the secondary temporary UID is no longer present in the rolling proximity identifier generation
- Test Bluetooth LE discovery to confirm devices can no longer be tracked via the secondary UID
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-13702 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-13702 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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