CVE-2020-14195
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.5 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.jsecurity.realm.jndi.JndiRealmFactory (aka org.jsecurity).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFasterXML jackson-databind versions before 2.9.10.5 improperly handles the interaction between serialization gadgets and polymorphic type handling, specifically when deserializing data involving the JndiRealmFactory class from org.jsecurity. This allows attackers to potentially exploit JNDI injection through crafted malicious serialized payloads, leading to remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 7.3>= 9.5= 8.0>= 2.9.0, < 2.9.10.5all versions= 9.3.6= 18.1= 18.2= 18.3= 19.1= 19.2= 20.1= 8.0.0.4.0= 8.0.0.5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify jackson-databind versionLocate the jackson-databind JAR file in your application classpath or dependencies (common paths: WEB-INF/lib, Maven local repository, Gradle cache). Check the filename or inspect the MANIFEST.MF file for the version. If using Maven, run 'mvn dependency:tree | grep jackson-databind' or check your pom.xml dependency declaration.Affected if The installed version is jackson-databind >= 2.9.0 and < 2.9.10.5 (or the specific product version falls within the affected ranges listed for Netapp, Oracle, or Debian)
-
Determine if polymorphic type handling is enabledSearch your Jackson ObjectMapper configuration code for settings like enableDefaultTyping(), enableDefaultTypingAsProperty(), or any use of ObjectMapper.DefaultTyping. Also check for @JsonTypeInfo annotations on your data models that allow dynamic type resolution.Affected if Polymorphic type handling is enabled (either via enableDefaultTyping() or default typing annotations) because this allows the deserialization of arbitrary classes specified in the JSON payload
-
Check for presence of JndiRealmFactory in classpathSearch for the JAR file containing JndiRealmFactory (org.jsecurity: realm or similar). Search your classpath directories for files containing 'JndiRealmFactory' or the org.jsecurity package. In Maven projects, run 'mvn dependency:tree' and look for jsecurity, shiro, or similar libraries.Affected if The JndiRealmFactory class from org.jsecurity is available in the runtime classpath, providing the gadget needed for JNDI injection
-
Identify if JSON deserialization accepts untrusted inputReview your application code to identify endpoints or services that accept JSON data from external sources and pass it to ObjectMapper for deserialization. Look for methods like readValue() receiving data from HTTP requests, message queues, or file uploads.Affected if Your application deserializes JSON data from untrusted or external sources using ObjectMapper without strict type whitelisting
You are affected if your environment uses jackson-databind version 2.9.0 through 2.9.10.4, has polymorphic type handling enabled, and deserializes untrusted JSON that could reference the JndiRealmFactory class.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data2.9.10.5
Upgrade jackson-databind to version 2.9.10.5 or later. Additionally, disable polymorphic type handling or enable strict whitelist filtering for untrusted input to mitigate deserialization attacks.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,808.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-14195 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-14195 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data