CVE-2020-15593
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSteelCentral Aternity Agent 11.0.0.120 on Windows mishandles IPC. It uses an executable running as a high privileged Windows service to perform administrative tasks and collect data from other processes. It distributes functionality among different processes and uses IPC (Inter-Process Communication) primitives to enable the processes to cooperate. Any user in the system is allowed to access the interprocess communication channel AternityAgentAssistantIpc, retrieve a serialized object and call object methods remotely. Among others, the methods allow any user to: (1) Create and/or overwrite arbitrary XML files across the system; (2) Create arbitrary directories across the system; and (3) Load arbitrary plugins (i.e., C# assemblies) from the "%PROGRAMFILES(X86)/Aternity Information Systems/Assistant/plugins” directory and execute code contained in them.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSteelCentral Aternity Agent uses an IPC channel (AternityAgentAssistantIpc) accessible to any local user that allows remote method invocation on a high-privileged service. The IPC methods lack proper authorization, enabling unprivileged users to write arbitrary XML files anywhere on the system, create directories, and load/execute arbitrary C# plugin assemblies from a specific directory.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 11.0.0.120CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify SteelCentral Aternity Agent is installedCheck for the presence of Riverbed SteelCentral Aternity Agent on the system. Look for the application in installed programs list or check for Aternity-related directories in Program Files.Affected if The application is not installed, this CVE does not apply.
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Identify the installed version of Aternity AgentLocate the Aternity Agent installation directory and check the version information, typically found in the product's About or version file, or via system inventory tools listing installed software.Affected if The installed version is exactly 11.0.0.120, which matches the affected version range.
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Confirm AternityAgentAssistant service is runningCheck if the AternityAgentAssistant service is running on the system using the Services console (services.msc) or command-line tools such as sc query or Get-Service.Affected if The service is running and the version is 11.0.0.120, enabling the vulnerable IPC channel.
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Check for plugin assembly directoryLocate the directory from which C# plugin assemblies can be loaded by the Aternity Agent service. This is typically found within the Aternity installation directory structure.Affected if The plugin directory exists and is accessible, allowing potential exploitation of the arbitrary assembly loading capability.
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Verify IPC channel accessibilityInspect the permissions and configuration of the AternityAgentAssistantIpc channel to confirm it is accessible to local users, which would allow unprivileged code execution.Affected if The IPC channel permits access from non-privileged user contexts, enabling the authorization bypass.
You are affected if Riverbed SteelCentral Aternity Agent version 11.0.0.120 is installed and the AternityAgentAssistant service is running, exposing the unprotected AternityAgentAssistantIpc channel to local users.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor patch if available; otherwise, restrict system access to trusted users only and monitor for unauthorized access to the AternityAgentAssistantIpc IPC channel.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-15593 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-15593 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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