CVE-2020-17407
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThis vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Microhard Bullet-LTE prior to v1.2.0-r1112. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of authentication headers. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-10596.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBuffer overflow vulnerability in the authentication header handling of Microhard Bullet-LTE devices prior to v1.2.0-r1112. The device fails to validate the length of user-supplied data before copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to overflow this buffer and execute arbitrary code in the root context.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.2.0-r1112CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the device label, web interface footer, or system information page to confirm the exact model number is Microhard Bullet-LTEAffected if The device is not a Microhard Bullet-LTE product, as this vulnerability affects only that specific product line
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the device web management interface and navigate to the Status or System section to view the firmware version, or use SNMP to query the device firmware version OID if availableAffected if The firmware version is lower than 1.2.0-r1112, meaning it falls within the affected range < 1.2.0-r1112
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Determine if the management interface is network-accessibleCheck network firewall rules, ACLs, or device network configuration to see if the device HTTP/HTTPS management ports are reachable from network segments outside the expected administrative zoneAffected if The management interface is exposed to untrusted networks, as the vulnerability is exploitable by an unauthenticated remote attacker
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Verify authentication configuration statusCheck the device security settings to confirm whether authentication is currently enabled and properly configured for the web management interfaceAffected if Authentication is disabled or misconfigured, as the vulnerability exists in the authentication header handling code path
The environment is affected if the device is a Microhard Bullet-LTE running firmware version lower than 1.2.0-r1112 with its management interface accessible to network attackers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.2.0-r1112
Upgrade to Microhard Bullet-LTE firmware v1.2.0-r1112 or later. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement network segmentation to restrict access to the device's management interface.
Bullet LTE Firmware v1.2.0-r1112 or later
- Download firmware version 1.2.0-r1112 or later from the official Microhard Systems support website
- Access the device web-based management interface
- Navigate to the Firmware Upgrade or System section
- Upload and apply the new firmware file
- Allow the device to reboot and complete the upgrade process
- Verify the firmware version has been updated to 1.2.0-r1112 or later
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-17407 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-17407 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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