CVE-2020-25193
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBy having access to the hard-coded cryptographic key for GE Reason RT430, RT431 & RT434 GNSS clocks in firmware versions prior to version 08A06, attackers would be able to intercept and decrypt encrypted traffic through an HTTPS connection.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe GE Reason RT430, RT431, and RT434 GNSS clocks contain a hard-coded cryptographic key embedded in the firmware prior to version 08A06. This static key allows any attacker who obtains it (e.g., through firmware extraction) to decrypt HTTPS traffic to and from the device, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks and credential theft.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 08a06< 08a06< 08a06CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the device modelLocate and verify the device is a GE Reason RT430, RT431, or RT434 GNSS clock. Check the physical device label, the web management interface, or the CLI system information for the exact model numberAffected if Device is not one of the three affected models (RT430, RT431, RT434)
-
Retrieve the firmware versionAccess the device's web interface, command-line interface, or management console to obtain the currently installed firmware version. This is typically found in system status, device info, or firmware upgrade sectionsAffected if Unable to determine firmware version or version information is unavailable
-
Compare version to affected rangeCompare the installed firmware version against the affected range. The device is vulnerable if the version is numerically less than 08A06 (for example, 08A05, 08A04, 07A09, or earlier)Affected if Firmware version is < 08A06
The device is affected if it is a GE Reason RT430, RT431, or RT434 running firmware version prior to 08A06, meaning the hard-coded cryptographic key is present in the firmware.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped08a06
Update affected device firmware to version 08A06 or later, which should implement proper per-device key management. If immediate patching is not possible, restrict network access to these devices and monitor for suspicious interception attempts.
Firmware version 08A06
- Obtain firmware version 08A06 from the official GE Grid Solutions support portal or through your established vendor support channel
- Consult GE Reason RT430/RT431/RT434 hardware documentation for the specific firmware update procedure applicable to your device model
- Follow the vendor's recommended steps to upload and apply firmware version 08A06 to the affected device
- After upgrade, verify the device is running firmware version 08A06 or higher
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-25193 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-25193 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data