CVE-2020-25229
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been identified in LOGO! 8 BM (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V8.3). The implemented encryption for communication with affected devices is prone to replay attacks due to the usage of a static key. An attacker could change the password or change the configuration on any affected device if using prepared messages that were generated for another device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe LOGO! 8 BM devices use a static encryption key for device communication, allowing attackers to capture valid encrypted messages from one device and replay them to other affected devices. This replay attack enables unauthorized password changes or configuration modifications on any vulnerable device.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 8.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the device modelLocate the physical device or check network inventory to confirm the device is a Siemens LOGO! 8 BM (BM = Base Module). Verify the model number on the device label or in your asset inventory.Affected if The device is any Siemens LOGO! 8 BM variant (not newer Logo! 8.3 or 8.4 models)
-
Determine the installed firmware versionAccess the device through Logo! Soft Comfort software, or log into the device web interface if available, or check the device system info via the display menu. Note the firmware version displayed.Affected if The firmware version cannot be determined or is visible as a version number lower than 8.3
-
Compare version against affected rangeCheck the firmware version number against the affected range: any version before 8.3 (for example, 8.2, 8.1, 8.0, or earlier) indicates the device uses the static encryption key vulnerable to replay attacks.Affected if The firmware version is below 8.3 (for example, 8.2.x or earlier)
-
Confirm static key vulnerability contextUnderstand that this is a design-level flaw in firmware versions prior to 8.3. The vulnerability exists because all devices shipped with firmware below 8.3 share the same static encryption key for device communication.Affected if The device is running any pre-V8.3 firmware regardless of configuration settings
If the device is a Siemens LOGO! 8 BM and the firmware version is below 8.3, the device is affected by this vulnerability and could be impacted by replay attacks using captured encrypted messages.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data8.3
Upgrade all LOGO! 8 BM devices to firmware version V8.3 or later, which implements proper dynamic key generation. Until patches are applied, isolate affected devices on restricted network segments and monitor for suspicious repeated authentication patterns.
- Consultation12.0 h
- Implementation20.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $13,728.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-25229 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-25229 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data