CVE-2020-25600
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Out of bounds event channels are available to 32-bit x86 domains. The so called 2-level event channel model imposes different limits on the number of usable event channels for 32-bit x86 domains vs 64-bit or Arm (either bitness) ones. 32-bit x86 domains can use only 1023 channels, due to limited space in their shared (between guest and Xen) information structure, whereas all other domains can use up to 4095 in this model. The recording of the respective limit during domain initialization, however, has occurred at a time where domains are still deemed to be 64-bit ones, prior to actually honoring respective domain properties. At the point domains get recognized as 32-bit ones, the limit didn't get updated accordingly. Due to this misbehavior in Xen, 32-bit domains (including Domain 0) servicing other domains may observe event channel allocations to succeed when they should really fail. Subsequent use of such event channels would then possibly lead to corruption of other parts of the shared info structure. An unprivileged guest may cause another domain, in particular Domain 0, to misbehave. This may lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) for the entire system. All Xen versions from 4.4 onwards are vulnerable. Xen versions 4.3 and earlier are not vulnerable. Only x86 32-bit domains servicing other domains are vulnerable. Arm systems, as well as x86 64-bit domains, are not vulnerable.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn Xen 4.4+, the event channel limit for 32-bit x86 domains was recorded before the domain type was correctly identified, causing these domains to receive the 4095-channel limit instead of the correct 1023-channel limit. This allows event channel allocations to succeed when they should fail, leading to corruption of the shared info structure between guest and hypervisor. An unprivileged guest can trigger this in Domain 0 or other 32-bit domains, causing system-wide DoS.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 31= 32= 33= 10.0>= 4.4.0, <= 4.14.0= 15.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify installed Xen versionRun 'xl info' or 'xm info' to display hypervisor version information, or check /sys/hypervisor/version if availableAffected if Version is 4.4.0 through 4.14.0 inclusive
-
Determine if 32-bit x86 domains are runningExecute 'xl list' to enumerate active domains and check their bitness, or query domain configuration files for arch typeAffected if Any 32-bit x86 paravirtualized domain (domU or dom0) is active
-
Check for Domain 0 architectureRun 'uname -a' within Domain 0 to verify if it is a 32-bit kernel, or check dom0 kernel package versionAffected if Domain 0 is running a 32-bit x86 kernel
-
Inspect event channel allocationMonitor Xen event channel usage via 'xl debugs keys' or check /proc/xen for channel allocations in guest domainsAffected if Event channel allocations succeed beyond expected 1023 limit for 32-bit domains
-
Review shared info structure integrityCheck Xen logs (xm dmesg or journalctl for xen domain messages) for corruption warnings or failures related to shared info pagesAffected if Errors appear indicating shared info structure corruption or unexpected event channel behavior in 32-bit domains
You are affected if running Xen version 4.4.0-4.14.0 with any active 32-bit x86 domain (including dom0 as 32-bit) where event channels exceed the intended 1023 limit.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched Xen version. If immediate patching is not possible, avoid running untrusted 32-bit x86 paravirtualized guests and consider restricting 32-bit domain usage to trusted workloads only.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,616.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-25600 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-25600 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data