CVE-2020-26122
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedInspur NF5266M5 through 3.21.2 and other server M5 devices allow remote code execution via administrator privileges. The Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) program of INSPUR server is weak in checking the firmware and lacks the signature verification mechanism, the attacker who obtains the administrator's rights can control the BMC by inserting malicious code into the firmware program and bypassing the current verification mechanism to upgrade the BMC.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Inspur NF5266M5 and other M5 series server BMC firmware lacks signature verification during the update process, allowing an authenticated administrator to inject malicious code into the BMC firmware and achieve remote code execution by bypassing the weak verification mechanism.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.19.34< 1.19.34< 4.5.3< 1.19.33< 1.19.33< 1.19.33< 4.26.6< 1.18.51CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the BMC modelAccess the server's BMC web interface or use IPMI commands (e.g., ipmitool -I lanplus -U ADMIN -P ADMIN chassis status) to identify the exact model number. Look for model identifiers: NF8480M5, NF8260M5, NS5162M5, NS5488M5, NS5484M5, NS5482M5, NF5280M5, or NF5468M5.Affected if The BMC model matches any of the Inspur M5 series models listed in the affected products.
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Determine the BMC firmware versionVia BMC web interface: Navigate to Settings > Firmware Information or similar. Via IPMI: Use command 'ipmitool -I lanplus -U ADMIN -P ADMIN raw' or check firmware version through BMC diagnostics. Record the exact firmware version number displayed.Affected if The installed firmware version is lower than 1.19.34 (for NF8480M5, NF8260M5), 4.5.3 (for NS5162M5), 1.19.33 (for NS5488M5, NS5484M5, NS5482M5), 4.26.6 (for NF5280M5), or 1.18.51 (for NF5468M5).
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Verify firmware update capability is exposedCheck if the BMC firmware update interface is accessible. In BMC web interface, look for Firmware Update, BMC Update, or Upgrade sections. Via IPMI, check if firmware update commands are available. Note whether the update process presents any signature verification prompt.Affected if Firmware update functionality is accessible without evidence of cryptographic signature verification being enforced.
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Confirm administrative access existsReview BMC user accounts and access controls. Verify if an administrator-level account exists or could be obtained. The vulnerability requires authenticated administrator privileges to exploit the firmware update process.Affected if An administrator account is configured on the BMC or the BMC management interface is exposed to network segments with potential unauthorized users.
The environment is affected if the BMC is an Inspur M5 series model (NF8480M5, NF8260M5, NS5162M5, NS5488M5, NS5484M5, NS5482M5, NF5280M5, or NF5468M5) running firmware versions below the specified thresholds, and the firmware update feature is accessible to authenticated administrators.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data1.18.511.19.331.19.34
Restrict BMC administrative access to trusted personnel only, implement network segmentation for out-of-band management networks, monitor for unauthorized firmware updates, and apply vendor-provided firmware patches that implement proper signature verification.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-26122 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-26122 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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