CVE-2020-26555
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability affects Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification versions 1.0B through 5.2. An unauthenticated nearby attacker can spoof the BD_ADDR (Bluetooth device address) of a legitimate peer device during the pairing process, allowing them to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 34>= 1.1b, <= 5.2all versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Bluetooth is enabled and in legacy BR/EDR modeOn Linux, run 'hciconfig -a' to list Bluetooth adapters and check their configuration. Look for 'BR/EDR' mode and whether the device is 'UP' and 'RUNNING'. On Windows, check Device Manager under Bluetooth radios.Affected if Bluetooth adapter is active in BR/EDR mode (Classic Bluetooth)
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Confirm legacy PIN code pairing is availableOn Linux, check 'hciconfig' output for 'AUTH' and 'ENCRYPT' flags. Review Bluetooth configuration files in /etc/bluetooth/ for pairing agent settings. Run 'bluetoothctl show' to check pairing capabilities. On Windows, check Bluetooth settings for 'Legacy pairing' or 'PIN' options.Affected if Legacy PIN code authentication method is enabled or available on the Bluetooth stack
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Check Bluetooth Core Specification version in useOn Linux, run 'hciconfig -a' and look for 'HCI Version' in the output. The version number corresponds to Core Spec versions (e.g., 5.0 = Core Spec 5.0). Compare against the affected range 1.1b through 5.2.Affected if HCI Version shown is between 1.1b and 5.2 (values approximately 1 through 10 in hcitool output)
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Identify Intel wireless adapter firmware versionOn Linux, run 'lspci | grep -i intel' to find the wireless adapter, then use vendor tools or 'btmgmt info' if available. On Windows, check Device Manager under Network adapters, right-click the Intel Wi-Fi/Bluetooth adapter, select Properties, then look for Firmware version on the Details tab.Affected if Firmware version matches Intel Ax210, Ax201, Ax200, AC 9560, AC 9462, or AC 9461 (all versions affected)
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Check for Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) enforcementOn Linux, examine /etc/bluetooth/main.conf for 'SecureSimplePairing' setting. Run 'hciconfig' to check if SSP is enabled. Verify 'IO Capability' settings in bluetoothd configuration restrict legacy pairing.Affected if Secure Simple Pairing is not enforced and legacy PIN pairing remains as an option
Your environment is affected if Bluetooth BR/EDR is active with legacy PIN code pairing enabled on a stack implementation following Core Spec 1.1b-5.2, or on any of the listed Intel wireless adapter firmware versions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable legacy PIN code pairing on affected devices and enforce Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) or LE Secure Connections with authentication. Consider firmware updates from device vendors that remove deprecated pairing methods.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-26555 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-26555 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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