CVE-2020-26604
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in SystemUI on Samsung mobile devices with O(8.x), P(9.0), Q(10.0), and R(11.0) software. PendingIntent allows an unprivileged process to access contact numbers. The Samsung ID is SVE-2020-18467 (October 2020).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA vulnerability in Samsung SystemUI allows an unprivileged process to access contact numbers through improperly secured PendingIntent. PendingIntent in Android can be issued to other applications, and when not properly secured, it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive data like contacts.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 8.0= 8.1= 9.0= 10.0= 11.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if device is SamsungGo to Settings > About Phone and verify the manufacturer is Samsung, or run 'getprop ro.product.manufacturer' in ADB shellAffected if Manufacturer is not Samsung (this vulnerability affects Samsung SystemUI specifically)
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Verify Android versionGo to Settings > About Phone > Android version, or run 'getprop ro.build.version.release' in ADB shellAffected if Android version is 8.0, 8.1, 9.0, 10.0, or 11.0
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Confirm Samsung SystemUI is in useCheck SystemUI APK location - Samsung devices use /system/priv-app/SystemUI/SystemUI.apk versus AOSP location /system/priv-app/SystemUI. Run 'ls /system/priv-app/SystemUI/' in ADB shellAffected if Samsung SystemUI APK is present in /system/priv-app/SystemUI/ directory
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Check for contact-related PendingIntent exposureReview app logs when SystemUI displays contact information (e.g., incoming call screen). Use 'logcat | grep -i contact' to look for unauthorized access patternsAffected if Unprivileged apps can retrieve contact numbers via exposed PendingIntent from SystemUI
User is affected if using a Samsung device on Android 8.0-11.0 where Samsung SystemUI exposes contact data through improperly secured PendingIntent to unprivileged applications.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUsers should apply the October 2020 Samsung security patch. Samsung addressed this in their SystemUI component by properly securing PendingIntent calls to prevent unauthorized contact access.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-26604 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-26604 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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