CVE-2020-3547
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco AsyncOS software for Cisco Email Security Appliance (ESA), Cisco Content Security Management Appliance (SMA), and Cisco Web Security Appliance (WSA) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to access sensitive information on an affected device. The vulnerability exists because an insecure method is used to mask certain passwords on the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by looking at the raw HTML code that is received from the interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain some of the passwords configured throughout the interface.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability exists in the web-based management interface of Cisco AsyncOS software for ESA, SMA, and WSA devices. An insecure method is used to mask certain passwords in the HTML source code, allowing an authenticated attacker to view plaintext or weakly obfuscated passwords by examining the raw HTML received from the interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 13.5.1-277<= 13.6.1-193<= 11.7.2-011CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify your device model and product typeLog into the device CLI or check the web interface header to confirm whether the appliance is an ESA (Email Security Appliance), SMA (Security Management Appliance), or WSA (Web Security Appliance).Affected if The device is not one of these three product lines (ESA, SMA, or WSA), as the vulnerability only affects these AsyncOS devices.
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Check the AsyncOS versionIn the web-based management interface, navigate to the System Administration page or use the 'version' command in the CLI. Record the full AsyncOS version string (for example, 13.5.1-277).Affected if The installed version is 13.5.1-277 or earlier, 13.6.1-193 or earlier, or 11.7.2-011 or earlier.
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Verify the web-based management interface is enabledIn the web interface, go to Network > Interfaces or System Administration > Management Interface to confirm the HTTP or HTTPS web interface is active. Alternatively, attempt to access the management URL (for example, https://[device IP]/ecs) from a browser.Affected if The web-based management interface is accessible and enabled, which is the default configuration for these appliances.
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Inspect HTML source for password fields (optional manual check)If you have administrative access, log into the web interface, right-click on a password field (such as during user configuration or SMTP settings), and select 'View Page Source'. Search for 'value=' attributes containing obfuscated password strings.Affected if The HTML source reveals password values in an obfuscated but reversible format (such as base64 or simple encoding) rather than being completely masked or absent.
The environment is affected if the device is an ESA, SMA, or WSA running AsyncOS version 13.5.1-277 or earlier, 13.6.1-193 or earlier, or 11.7.2-011 or earlier, and the web-based management interface is enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the relevant Cisco security updates/patches for CVE-2020-3547. As a workaround, restrict administrative access to trusted users only until the patch can be applied.
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- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-3547 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-3547 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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