Ticketed LockApplication · Ticketed Lock Project

CVE-2020-36439

HIGH · 8.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2021-08-08
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 0.3.0 or later.
See remediation →
90/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
An issue was discovered in the ticketed_lock crate before 0.3.0 for Rust. There are unconditional implementations of Send for ReadTicket<T> and WriteTicket<T>.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The ticketed_lock crate before 0.3.0 unconditionally implements the `Send` trait for `ReadTicket<T>` and `WriteTicket<T>` types. This allows these lock tickets to be transferred across threads even when the contained data type T is not thread-safe (does not implement `Sync`), potentially leading to data races and undefined behavior.

MitigationUpgrade to ticketed_lock version 0.3.0 or later, which presumably introduces conditional Send implementations based on the thread-safety of T.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Ticketed LockApplication
Affected:< 0.3.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate ticketed_lock in your dependency tree
    Search your Cargo.toml for 'ticketed_lock' under [dependencies] and check Cargo.lock for the resolved version
    Affected if The crate is present with a version lower than 0.3.0 (e.g., 0.2.x, 0.1.x)
  2. Identify ReadTicket and WriteTicket usage
    Grep your source code for 'ReadTicket<' and 'WriteTicket<' type instantiations
    Affected if Either type is instantiated with a concrete type parameter T
  3. Verify if the contained type is Sync-safe
    For each ReadTicket<T> or WriteTicket<T> found, check if T implements the Sync trait (consult your code or check the type's documentation)
    Affected if T does not implement Sync (for example, using Rc<T>, RefCell<T>, or custom types without Send+Sync bounds)
  4. Check for cross-thread ownership transfer
    Search for code that moves ReadTicket<T> or WriteTicket<T> across thread boundaries (e.g., passing to thread::spawn, sending through channels)
    Affected if These types are transferred to another thread while containing a non-Sync type T

You are affected if ticketed_lock version < 0.3.0 is in your dependencies AND you use ReadTicket<T> or WriteTicket<T> with a type T that does not implement Sync and that gets transferred across threads.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 0.3.0 or later
Fixed in 0.3.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to ticketed_lock version 0.3.0 or later, which presumably introduces conditional Send implementations based on the thread-safety of T.

Recommended fix High confidence

0.3.0

  1. Update the version specification in Cargo.toml to require ticketed_lock version 0.3.0 or later (e.g., ticketed_lock = "0.3.0")
  2. Run `cargo update ticketed_lock` to fetch the new version
  3. Run `cargo build` or `cargo check` to verify the update compiles successfully
  4. Verify no runtime issues arise from the Send trait bound changes
Caveat The Send trait bounds may now be correctly constrained; code relying on the previous unsafe unconditional Send implementation may need review

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Fix this in Ticketed Lock Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation1.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,040
Get the upgrade done

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,664.

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-36439 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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