CVE-2020-36445
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn issue was discovered in the convec crate through 2020-11-24 for Rust. There are unconditional implementations of Send and Sync for ConVec<T>.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe convec crate unconditionally implements Send and Sync traits for ConVec<T> regardless of whether the contained type T is actually Send/Sync. This violates Rust's safety guarantees, as it allows ConVec<T> to be moved across threads or shared between threads even when T contains non-thread-safe types, potentially leading to data races and memory safety violations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2020-11-24CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate convec in your dependenciesSearch your project's Cargo.toml file for 'convec' under [dependencies] or [dev-dependencies], or run 'cargo tree -p convec' if the crate is already installed.Affected if convec appears as a direct or transitive dependency
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Determine the installed convec versionCheck your Cargo.lock file for the [[package]] entry with name="convec" and note the version number (e.g., version = "0.1.0" or version = "2020.11.24").Affected if The version is dated 2020-11-24 or earlier (versions before the fix were date-based like "2020.11.24")
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Verify version against affected rangeCompare the version found in Cargo.lock against the affected version <= 2020-11-24. If using a date-based version format, any version released on or before November 24, 2020 is vulnerable.Affected if The convec version is <= 2020-11-24
You are affected if the convec crate appears in your dependency tree and its version is dated 2020-11-24 or earlier, as these versions contain the unsafe unconditional Send/Sync implementations.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedReplace the unconditional Send and Sync implementations with conditional ones that require the contained type T to also implement Send and Sync, respectively: `impl<T: Send> Send for ConVec<T>` and `impl<T: Sync> Sync for ConVec<T>`.
Latest convec version after 2020-11-24 (check crates.io for post-2020-11-24 release)
- 1. Check the current version of convec in your Cargo.toml (e.g., convec = "0.1" or similar)
- 2. Run `cargo update convec` or manually update the version to the latest release after 2020-11-24
- 3. Run `cargo build` to rebuild with the fixed version
- 4. If compilation fails due to Send/Sync trait bounds changes, review code that passes non-Send/Sync types to ConVec and refactor to use thread-safe alternatives
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-36445 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-36445 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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