CVE-2020-6096
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn exploitable signed comparison vulnerability exists in the ARMv7 memcpy() implementation of GNU glibc 2.30.9000. Calling memcpy() (on ARMv7 targets that utilize the GNU glibc implementation) with a negative value for the 'num' parameter results in a signed comparison vulnerability. If an attacker underflows the 'num' parameter to memcpy(), this vulnerability could lead to undefined behavior such as writing to out-of-bounds memory and potentially remote code execution. Furthermore, this memcpy() implementation allows for program execution to continue in scenarios where a segmentation fault or crash should have occurred. The dangers occur in that subsequent execution and iterations of this code will be executed with this corrupted data.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA signed comparison vulnerability exists in the ARMv7 memcpy() implementation of GNU glibc 2.30.9000. When the 'num' parameter is underflowed to a negative value, the signed comparison causes the function to mishandle buffer sizes, leading to out-of-bounds memory writes and potential remote code execution. The implementation incorrectly allows execution to continue where a crash should occur, propagating corrupted data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 31= 32= 10.0<= 2.31CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify system architectureRun 'uname -m' or check /proc/cpuinfo for the processor architecture. The vulnerability specifically exists in the ARMv7 memcpy() implementation.Affected if The system is NOT running on ARMv7 (armv7l) architecture - the flaw only affects ARMv7 implementations of memcpy in glibc.
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Check installed glibc versionRun 'ldd --version' or check the libc6 package version with 'rpm -q glibc' (Fedora) or 'dpkg -l libc6' (Debian).Affected if The installed glibc version is 2.31 or higher - versions above 2.31 contain the fix for the signed comparison issue.
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Verify glibc source versionCheck the glibc source code version if accessible, looking for the memcpy implementation in 'sysdeps/arm/armv7/memcpy.S' or similar ARMv7-specific memcpy files.Affected if The memcpy implementation uses signed comparison for the 'num' parameter instead of unsigned comparison - this indicates the vulnerable code is present.
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Confirm application usage of memcpyReview application code or binaries that call memcpy() and may pass length parameters that could underflow to negative values due to integer handling bugs.Affected if Applications call memcpy with length values that could become negative through integer underflow, allowing the signed comparison vulnerability to be triggered.
A system is affected if it runs on ARMv7 architecture with glibc version 2.31 or lower AND applications can pass negative length values to memcpy, triggering the signed comparison flaw.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade glibc to a patched version that uses unsigned comparison for the length parameter; additionally, validate all buffer length inputs in applications before calling memcpy to prevent passing negative values.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-6096 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-6096 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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