CVE-2020-6787
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedLoading a DLL through an Uncontrolled Search Path Element in the Bosch Video Client installer up to and including version 1.7.6.079 potentially allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim's system. A prerequisite is that the victim is tricked into placing a malicious DLL in the same directory where the installer is started from.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Bosch Video Client installer up to v1.7.6.079 loads DLLs from its working directory without proper validation, following an uncontrolled search path. An attacker can place a specially crafted malicious DLL in the same directory as the installer; when the victim runs the installer, it loads the attacker's DLL with elevated privileges, enabling arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.7.6.079CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Find installed Bosch Video Client versionCheck the Windows registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{Product GUID} or look in C:\Program Files\Bosch\Video Client for version informationAffected if The installed version is 1.7.6.079 or lower
-
Locate the Bosch Video Client installerSearch for files named 'BoschVideoClient*.exe' or 'BVCSetup*.exe' on the system using File Explorer search or command: dir /s /b C:\*Bosch*Video*Client*.exeAffected if The installer exists on the system and can be run
-
Inspect the directory containing the installerExamine all files in the same folder as the installer executable. Look for any .dll files that were not part of the original installer package, especially unfamiliar or recently added DLLsAffected if The installer resides in a directory containing additional DLL files from untrusted sources
-
Verify DLL search path behaviorCheck if SafeDLLSearchMode is enabled on the system: reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager /v SafeDllSearchMode. A value of 1 means enabled, 0 means disabledAffected if SafeDLLSearchMode is disabled (value 0) and the installer is run from a directory with potentially malicious DLLs
You are affected if Bosch Video Client version 1.7.6.079 or lower is installed, or if the installer exists on your system in a directory containing untrusted DLL files that could be loaded via the uncontrolled search path.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUsers should run the installer from a clean, trusted directory and avoid placing any files alongside the installer from untrusted sources. The vendor should implement secure DLL loading by using absolute paths, enabling SafeDLLSearchMode, and validating/signing DLLs before loading.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,928.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-6787 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-6787 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data