CVE-2020-9438
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedTinxy Door Lock with firmware before 3.2 allow attackers to unlock a door by replaying an Unlock request that occurred when the attacker was previously authorized. In other words, door-access revocation is mishandled.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Tinxy Door Lock firmware before version 3.2 is vulnerable to a replay attack where previously captured Unlock requests can be reused to unlock the door even after the user's authorization has been revoked. This indicates the lock lacks proper session invalidation, sequence numbering, or cryptographic nonces to prevent replay of valid but stale authentication commands.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 3.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the device label or check the Tinxy app/device documentation to confirm the model is a Tinxy Smart Wifi Door Lock. If you do not have a Tinxy device, this CVE does not apply.Affected if The device is not a Tinxy Smart Wifi Door Lock, then you are not affected.
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Check the installed firmware versionAccess the Tinxy mobile app and navigate to the device settings, or log into the device's web interface if available, to view the current firmware version. Compare it against the affected range of < 3.2.Affected if The firmware version is 3.2 or later, you are not affected by this vulnerability.
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Determine if remote/network unlock is enabledCheck the Tinxy app settings or device configuration to see if remote unlock (internet-based unlock) is enabled. Replay attacks require the unlock command to be transmitted over the network where it can be captured.Affected if Remote unlock is disabled and only local Bluetooth unlock is used, the exploit may not be practical.
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Assess network exposureReview your network configuration to determine if the Tinxy lock is accessible from untrusted networks (such as directly exposed to the internet or on the same network as untrusted devices). Check router firewall rules and port forwarding settings.Affected if The device is not accessible from untrusted networks, the attack surface is reduced.
You are affected if you have a Tinxy Smart Wifi Door Lock with firmware version below 3.2 that has remote unlock enabled and is accessible from networks where an attacker could capture unlock traffic.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data3.2
Upgrade the Tinxy Door Lock firmware to version 3.2 or later, which should contain proper anti-replay protections. If firmware update is unavailable, implement network segmentation to reduce the likelihood of traffic capture and consider disabling remote unlock features until the device can be patched.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-9438 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-9438 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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