CVE-2020-9501
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAttackers can obtain Cloud Key information from the Dahua Web P2P control in specific ways. Cloud Key is used to authenticate the connection between the client tool and the platform. An attacker may use the leaked Cloud Key to impersonate the client to connect to the platform, resulting in additional consumption of platform server resources. Versions with Build time before April 2020 are affected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Dahua Web P2P control improperly exposes Cloud Key authentication credentials, allowing remote attackers to obtain these keys through specific manipulation. The leaked Cloud Key enables attackers to impersonate legitimate clients and connect to the platform, causing unauthorized consumption of server resources.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2020-04CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Dahua device firmware versionAccess the device web interface or use the ONVIF/SNMP protocol to query the firmware version. Common paths: Device Info > Version, or via SSH run 'grep build /mnt/mtd/ver.txt' or similar version file.Affected if Firmware build date is before April 2020 (versions prior to the 2020-04 release)
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Confirm Web P2P service is enabledCheck device network settings for P2P/Cloud configuration. In web UI: Network > P2P or Platform > P2P. Look for status showing 'Enable' or 'Online'. CLI: check for p2p process running via 'ps | grep p2p'.Affected if P2P/Cloud connection is enabled and the device is exposed to internet or untrusted networks
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Verify P2P port exposureCheck router/firewall port forwarding rules and device network configuration. P2P typically uses ports 37777, 8000, or custom ports. Scan external interfaces: 'nmap -p 37777,8000 <external-ip>'.Affected if Device management ports (especially P2P ports) are directly exposed to the internet without firewall filtering
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Review P2P connection logs for unauthorized accessAccess device logs via: Web UI > Log Search > P2P/Network logs, or via API: 'http://<device-ip>/cgi-bin/log.cgi?type=P2P'. Look for connection attempts from unfamiliar client IDs or IP addresses.Affected if Logs show connections from unknown client IDs or multiple simultaneous P2P connections from suspicious sources
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Check Cloud Key configuration exposureInspect the device configuration file for cloud-related parameters. Via API: 'http://<device-ip>/cgi-bin/config.cgi?action=get&channel=0' and look for 'cloud' or 'p2p' sections. Check if credentials are transmitted unencrypted.Affected if P2P configuration contains active Cloud Keys and device accepts connections without additional authentication verification
The environment is affected if the Dahua device runs firmware with build date prior to April 2020 AND has Web P2P service enabled, particularly if the management interface is internet-exposed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data2020-04
Upgrade Dahua device firmware to versions with Build time after April 2020. Additionally, monitor for unauthorized P2P connections and implement network segmentation to limit exposure of management interfaces.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2020-9501 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2020-9501 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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