CVE-2021-0953
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIn setOnClickActivityIntent of SearchWidgetProvider.java, there is a possible way to access contacts and history bookmarks without permission due to an unsafe PendingIntent. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10 Android-11 Android-12 Android-9Android ID: A-184046278
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceIn setOnClickActivityIntent of SearchWidgetProvider.java, an unsafe PendingIntent allows local apps to access contacts and history bookmarks without proper permission checks, enabling local privilege escalation. The PendingIntent is not properly secured (likely missing FLAG_IMMUTABLE or proper intent explicitness), allowing malicious apps to intercept or hijack the intent.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 9.0= 10.0= 11.0= 12.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Android versionGo to Settings > About Phone > Android version, or run 'getprop ro.build.version.release' via ADB shellAffected if Version equals 9.0, 10.0, 11.0, or 12.0 (any of the affected versions listed)
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Identify apps using SearchWidgetProviderUse ADB to list packages: 'adb shell pm list packages | xargs -I {} adb shell dumpsys package {} | grep -i searchwidgetprovider' or decompile APKs to search for 'SearchWidgetProvider' class referencesAffected if Any installed app implements or extends SearchWidgetProvider class
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Inspect PendingIntent creation in SearchWidgetProviderDecompile the suspected APK and examine the setOnClickActivityIntent method in SearchWidgetProvider.java for PendingIntent creation. Check if FLAG_IMMUTABLE is present and if intent extras are set explicitly at creation timeAffected if PendingIntent is created without FLAG_IMMUTABLE and intent data can be modified externally
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Verify intent explicitnessIn the decompiled code, examine the intent used with the PendingIntent and check if action, data, and extras are fully specified at creation rather than relying on implicit or mutable stateAffected if Intent lacks explicit action string or data URI, allowing hijacking
The device is affected if it runs Android 9.0-12.0 AND contains an app using SearchWidgetProvider where the PendingIntent in setOnClickActivityIntent lacks FLAG_IMMUTABLE or explicit intent specification.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedSecure the PendingIntent by using FLAG_IMMUTABLE (or FLAG_UPDATE_CURRENT with proper intent specificity) and ensure all intent extras and data are set explicitly at creation time rather than relying on mutable state that can be modified by other apps.
Android Security Patch Level November 2021 (2021-11-01) or later for Android 9, 10, 11, and 12
- 1. Go to Settings on the Android device
- 2. Navigate to System > Security > Google Play system update (or Settings > About Phone > Software Update on some devices)
- 3. Check for and install the latest Android security update
- 4. Verify the patch level is November 2021 (2021-11-01) or later by checking Settings > About Phone > Android version > Security patch level
- 5. Confirm the update addresses the SearchWidgetProvider PendingIntent vulnerability
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,752.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-0953 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-0953 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data