CVE-2021-1262
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple vulnerabilities in Cisco SD-WAN products could allow an authenticated attacker to perform command injection attacks against an affected device, which could allow the attacker to take certain actions with root privileges on the device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceMultiple command injection vulnerabilities in Cisco SD-WAN products allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system with root privileges. The vulnerabilities stem from insufficient input validation in the SD-WAN management interface, enabling attackers to inject OS commands through crafted requests.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 19.2.4>= 19.3.0, < 20.1.2>= 20.3, < 20.3.2= 20.4all versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Cisco SD-WAN product componentDetermine which SD-WAN component is deployed: Cisco SD-WAN Firmware (vEdge), vSmart Controller, Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (vManage), or vBond Orchestrator. Check your device documentation or network inventory for the component type.Affected if The product is any Cisco SD-WAN component listed in the affected products (SD-WAN Firmware, vSmart Controller, Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, or vBond Orchestrator).
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Determine the installed firmware or software versionAccess the device CLI or management interface and run the appropriate version command, such as 'show version' or check the vManage/Catalyst SD-WAN Manager web UI under Administration > Software Repository to identify the exact installed version.Affected if The installed version cannot be determined or is in the affected ranges: SD-WAN Firmware < 19.2.4, >= 19.3.0 and < 20.1.2, >= 20.3 and < 20.3.2, or = 20.4; vSmart Controller, Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, or vBond Orchestrator at any version.
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Verify the SD-WAN management interface accessibilityCheck network configurations, ACLs, and firewall rules to determine if the SD-WAN management interface (typically ports 443, 22, or vendor-specific ports) is exposed to untrusted networks or the internet. Review routing tables and interface bindings.Affected if The management interface is accessible from untrusted networks, enabling an authenticated attacker to reach it.
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Confirm authentication is required for the management interfaceAttempt to access the SD-WAN management interface (web UI or CLI) to verify whether authentication is enforced. Check configuration for any bypassed authentication rules.Affected if The management interface can be accessed without authentication, or if authentication can be bypassed.
You are affected if your environment runs any Cisco SD-WAN component (vSmart, vManage, vBond, or SD-WAN Firmware) at a version within the affected ranges or at any version for vSmart/vManage/vBond, AND the management interface is network-accessible to potential attackers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data19.2.420.1.220.3.2
Apply the vendor-supplied patches from Cisco's security advisory for the affected SD-WAN product versions. Restrict management interface access to authorized personnel via network segmentation and ACLs.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-1262 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-1262 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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