CVE-2021-20171
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedNetgear RAX43 version 1.0.3.96 stores sensitive information in plaintext. All usernames and passwords for the device's associated services are stored in plaintext on the device. For example, the admin password is stored in plaintext in the primary configuration file on the device.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Netgear RAX43 router firmware version 1.0.3.96 stores all usernames and passwords in plaintext within the primary configuration file. This means any attacker with read access to the configuration file (via local access, config backup, or firmware extraction) can recover all device credentials in cleartext.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0.3.96CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the router modelAccess the router admin interface or check the device label to confirm the model is Netgear RAX43Affected if The device is not a Netgear RAX43 (different models have different vulnerabilities)
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Check the firmware versionLog into the router admin interface and navigate to the firmware version information page, or use the command line if available, to determine the installed firmware versionAffected if The installed firmware version is exactly 1.0.3.96 (no other versions are affected per the CVE)
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Locate the primary configuration fileAccess the router configuration backup feature to download the config file, or if you have local access, find the primary config file on the device filesystem - the exact file path varies by firmware but is typically named config or similar in the /etc or /mnt/config directoriesAffected if You cannot access the config file (but the check still applies if you can)
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Inspect credentials in the configuration fileOpen the configuration file in a text editor or use grep to search for password-related fields. Look for plaintext strings that appear to be credentials, particularly entries containing username and password pairs in cleartext format rather than hashed or encrypted valuesAffected if The configuration file contains plaintext username and password entries (this confirms exploitation potential)
A user is affected if they have a Netgear RAX43 router running firmware version 1.0.3.96 and possess or can obtain the router configuration file which contains plaintext credentials.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied firmware updates when released by Netgear. Until then, limit physical and administrative access to the device and configuration files.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,200.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-20171 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-20171 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data