CVE-2021-28689
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedx86: Speculative vulnerabilities with bare (non-shim) 32-bit PV guests 32-bit x86 PV guest kernels run in ring 1. At the time when Xen was developed, this area of the i386 architecture was rarely used, which is why Xen was able to use it to implement paravirtualisation, Xen's novel approach to virtualization. In AMD64, Xen had to use a different implementation approach, so Xen does not use ring 1 to support 64-bit guests. With the focus now being on 64-bit systems, and the availability of explicit hardware support for virtualization, fixing speculation issues in ring 1 is not a priority for processor companies. Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is an architectural x86 extension put together to combat speculative execution sidechannel attacks, including Spectre v2. It was retrofitted in microcode to existing CPUs. For more details on Spectre v2, see: http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-254.html However, IBRS does not architecturally protect ring 0 from predictions learnt in ring 1. For more details, see: https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/deep-dives/deep-dive-indirect-branch-restricted-speculation Similar situations may exist with other mitigations for other kinds of speculative execution attacks. The situation is quite likely to be similar for speculative execution attacks which have yet to be discovered, disclosed, or mitigated.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidence32-bit x86 PV guest kernels run in ring 1, and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 do not architecturally protect ring 0 (hypervisor) from speculative predictions learned in ring 1 (guest). This allows malicious 32-bit PV guests to potentially influence hypervisor speculative execution, exposing sensitive data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.12.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Xen hypervisor versionRun 'xl version' or 'xm version' to get the Xen version number, or check the package manager (e.g., 'dpkg -l | grep xen' on Debian/Ubuntu, 'rpm -q xen' on RHEL/CentOS)Affected if The Xen version is below 4.12.0
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Identify guest domain typeFor each guest domain, run 'xl list -l <domain_name>' and check the 'builder' field; PV indicates paravirtualized guestsAffected if Any guest domain shows builder: 'pv' (paravirtualized) rather than 'hvm' (hardware-assisted virtualization)
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Identify guest kernel architectureCheck the guest kernel by examining files inside the guest filesystem image (e.g., /boot/vmlinuz-* or /lib/modules/*) or by running 'file /boot/vmlinuz-*' on the guest kernel image; 32-bit kernels will show 'i386' or 'i686' in the outputAffected if The guest is running a 32-bit x86 kernel (i386/i686) as a PV (paravirtualized) guest
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Confirm PV guest configurationReview the guest configuration file in /etc/xen/<guest_name>.cfg (or /var/lib/xen/auto/) and look for 'kernel' directive (indicating PV) rather than 'builder = "hvm"' (which indicates HVM)Affected if The guest configuration uses a 'kernel' directive without 'builder = hvm', confirming it is a paravirtualized guest
You are affected if your Xen version is below 4.12.0 AND you are running 32-bit x86 PV (paravirtualized) guests; 64-bit guests or HVM guests are not impacted by this specific flaw.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data4.12.0
Migrate away from 32-bit PV guests to 64-bit or use hardware-assisted virtualization (HVM); alternatively, apply hypervisor-level workarounds if available and test thoroughly for functionality impacts.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-28689 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-28689 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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