FedoraOperating system · Fedoraproject

CVE-2021-28697

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2021-08-27
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 4.15.0 or later.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
grant table v2 status pages may remain accessible after de-allocation Guest get permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, get de-allocated when a guest switched (back) from v2 to v1. The freeing of such pages requires that the hypervisor know where in the guest these pages were mapped. The hypervisor tracks only one use within guest space, but racing requests from the guest to insert mappings of these pages may result in any of them to become mapped in multiple locations. Upon switching back from v2 to v1, the guest would then retain access to a page that was freed and perhaps re-used for other purposes.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

A race condition in Xen hypervisor's grant table v2 implementation allows guest VMs to retain access to freed memory pages. When a guest switches from grant table v2 to v1, status pages are de-allocated, but due to a flaw where the hypervisor only tracks one mapping location, racing mapping requests can cause pages to remain mapped in multiple locations. Upon switching back to v1, the guest retains access to freed and potentially re-used pages, enabling information disclosure or privilege escalation.

MitigationUpgrade Xen hypervisor to a patched version. This is a hypervisor-level vulnerability requiring host-side remediation; guest-side workarounds are limited to isolation and monitoring until patching is feasible.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
FedoraOperating system
Affected:= 33= 34= 35
Debian LinuxOperating system
Affected:= 11.0
XenOperating system
Affected:>= 4.0.0, <= 4.15.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify Xen hypervisor version
    Run 'xl info' or 'xe host-list' and look for the hypervisor version string, or check /sys/hypervisor/version if available
    Affected if version is between 4.0.0 and 4.15.0 inclusive
  2. Confirm grant table v2 is in use
    Review guest VM configuration files in /etc/xen/ or via 'xl list -v' to check for 'grant_table_version=2' or 'type=grant_table_v2' in the VM definition
    Affected if any guest VM is configured to use grant table version 2 (gnttab v2)
  3. Check for grant table status page mappings
    Examine hypervisor logs (xl dmesg or /var/log/xen/console) for activity involving grant table status pages during v1/v2 transitions
    Affected if guests frequently switch between grant table versions, causing potential race condition window

You are affected if your Xen hypervisor version falls between 4.0.0 and 4.15.0 AND any guest VMs use grant table v2, enabling the race condition during version switches.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 4.15.0
Interim mitigation

Upgrade Xen hypervisor to a patched version. This is a hypervisor-level vulnerability requiring host-side remediation; guest-side workarounds are limited to isolation and monitoring until patching is feasible.

Fix this in Fedora Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing4.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
18.0 hours of engineering $3,200
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-28697 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-28697 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data