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JunosOperating system · Juniper

CVE-2021-31378

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2021-10-19
Patch available
A vendor patch is available. No clean upgrade release — apply the published patch.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click Patch available

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
In broadband environments, including but not limited to Enhanced Subscriber Management, (CHAP, PPP, DHCP, etc.), on Juniper Networks Junos OS devices where RADIUS servers are configured for managing subscriber access and a subscriber is logged in and then requests to logout, the subscriber may be forced into a "Terminating" state by an attacker who is able to send spoofed messages appearing to originate from trusted RADIUS server(s) destined to the device in response to the subscriber's request. These spoofed messages cause the Junos OS General Authentication Service (authd) daemon to force the broadband subscriber into this "Terminating" state which the subscriber will not recover from thereby causing a Denial of Service (DoS) to the endpoint device. Once in the "Terminating" state, the endpoint subscriber will no longer be able to access the network. Restarting the authd daemon on the Junos OS device will temporarily clear the subscribers out of the "Terminating" state. As long as the attacker continues to send these spoofed packets and subscribers request to be logged out, the subscribers will be returned to the "Terminating" state thereby creating a persistent Denial of Service to the subscriber. An indicator of compromise may be seen by displaying the output of "show subscribers summary". The presence of subscribers in the "Terminating" state may indicate the issue is occurring. This issue affects: Juniper Networks Junos OS 17.3 versions prior to 17.3R3-S12; 17.4 versions prior to 17.4R3-S5; 18.1 versions prior to 18.1R3-S13; 18.2 versions prior to 18.2R3-S8; 18.3 versions prior to 18.3R3-S5; 18.4 versions prior to 18.4R2-S8, 18.4R3-S9; 19.1 versions prior to 19.1R3-S6; 19.2 versions prior to 19.2R1-S7, 19.2R3-S3; 19.3 versions prior to 19.3R2-S6, 19.3R3-S3; 19.4 versions prior to 19.4R1-S4, 19.4R1-S4, 19.4R3-S3; 20.1 versions prior to 20.1R3; 20.2 versions prior to 20.2R3-S1; 20.3 versions prior to 20.3R3; 20.4 versions prior to 20.4R3; 21.1 versions prior to 21.1R2. This issue does not affect: Juniper Networks Junos OS 12.3 version 12.3R1 and later versions; 15.1 version 15.1R1 and later versions.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis

A detailed technical summary for this CVE is being prepared.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
JunosOperating system
Affected:= 17.3= 17.4= 18.1= 18.2= 18.3= 18.4= 19.1= 19.2= 19.3= 19.4= 20.1= 20.2

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Patch available Apply the vendor patch
Vendor patch kb.juniper.net →
Recommended fix High confidence

Upgrade to one of the fixed versions: 17.3R3-S12, 17.4R3-S5, 18.1R3-S13, 18.2R3-S8, or later versions (18.3R3-S5, 18.4R2-S8, 18.4R3-S9, 19.x, 20.x, 21.1R2+)

  1. 1. Identify the current Junos OS version running on the device using 'show version'
  2. 2. Determine which version branch (17.3, 17.4, 18.1, 18.2, etc.) the device is running
  3. 3. Plan maintenance window as upgrade will require device reboot
  4. 4. Download the appropriate fixed version from Juniper Networks: for 17.3 branch use 17.3R3-S12 or later; for 17.4 branch use 17.4R3-S5 or later; for 18.1 branch use 18.1R3-S13 or later; for 18.2 branch use 18.2R3-S8 or later
  5. 5. Upload the Junos OS upgrade package to the device using SCP or FTP
  6. 6. Run 'request system software add <package-name>' to install the upgrade
  7. 7. Reboot the device using 'request system reboot'
  8. 8. After reboot, verify the new version with 'show version'
Caveat Standard Junos OS upgrade considerations apply: review release notes for any configuration changes, test in lab environment first, and plan for potential rollback if issues occur

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-31378 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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