TimecardApplication · Reiner Sct

CVE-2021-33583

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2021-09-30
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
REINER timeCard 6.05.07 installs a Microsoft SQL Server with an sa password that is hardcoded in the TCServer.jar file.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

REINER timeCard 6.05.07 ships with a Microsoft SQL Server instance that uses a hardcoded sa password embedded in plaintext within the TCServer.jar file. An attacker who obtains the JAR file can extract these credentials and gain full administrative access to the database, potentially exposing sensitive employee time-tracking data and compromising the entire application.

MitigationChange the default sa password to a strong, unique value in SQL Server, update the application configuration accordingly, restrict access to the JAR file to prevent credential extraction, and conduct a broader review for additional hardcoded secrets.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
TimecardApplication
Affected:= 6.05.07

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the installed Reiner timeCard version
    Check the application version displayed in the timeCard software interface or look for version information in the installation directory. Typical locations include the TCServer directory or the application's about screen.
    Affected if The installed version is exactly 6.05.07, which ships with the hardcoded credentials.
  2. Locate the TCServer.jar file
    Search the Reiner timeCard installation directory for the file named TCServer.jar. Common paths include C:\Program Files\Reiner timeCard\ or /opt/reiner/timecard/ on Linux systems.
    Affected if The TCServer.jar file exists in the installation directory.
  3. Inspect TCServer.jar for hardcoded credentials
    Open the TCServer.jar file (which is a ZIP archive) and examine the contents for plaintext strings containing 'sa' or SQL Server connection parameters. Use a tool like 'strings' on Linux or open the JAR with 7-Zip on Windows to view embedded plaintext.
    Affected if The JAR file contains a hardcoded sa username and password in plaintext form.
  4. Check SQL Server authentication method
    Connect to the SQL Server instance used by timeCard and query authentication settings. Run 'SELECT name, authentication_type_desc FROM sys.server_principals WHERE name = 'sa'' to verify if the sa account is enabled and what authentication mode is in use.
    Affected if The sa account is enabled and uses the default password that was found in the JAR file.

You are affected if running Reiner timeCard version 6.05.07 with the TCServer.jar file containing hardcoded SQL Server sa credentials that are still in active use.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Change the default sa password to a strong, unique value in SQL Server, update the application configuration accordingly, restrict access to the JAR file to prevent credential extraction, and conduct a broader review for additional hardcoded secrets.

Fix this in Timecard Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
11.0 hours of engineering $1,980
Get help mitigating

An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,168.

Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

Check whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-33583 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.

References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-33583 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.

What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data