CVE-2021-33643
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn attacker who submits a crafted tar file with size in header struct being 0 may be able to trigger an calling of malloc(0) for a variable gnu_longlink, causing an out-of-bounds read.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA crafted tar file with size field set to 0 in the header struct triggers malloc(0) for the gnu_longlink variable, leading to an out-of-bounds read vulnerability during tar archive processing.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 35= 36= 37< 1.2.21= 20.03= 22.03CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify if libtar library is installedOn Linux systems, run: find /usr -name 'libtar*' 2>/dev/null or check your package manager (dnf/rpm for Fedora, yum/rpm for OpenEuler) for installed libtar packagesAffected if libtar is installed with version less than 1.2.21 (run: rpm -qa | grep libtar or dpkg -l | grep libtar)
-
Check libtar version directlyIf libtar.so or libtar.a is found, run: rpm -q --changelog libtar 2>/dev/null or check the library version with: strings libtar.so | grep -i version | head -5Affected if Version cannot be determined or shows a version prior to 1.2.21
-
Identify applications using libtarSearch for binaries that link to libtar: ldd /path/to/binary 2>/dev/null | grep libtar or scan application binaries with: strings binary_file | grep libtarAffected if Any application that processes tar files links to a vulnerable version of libtar
-
Check system tar utilities on FedoraOn Fedora systems, verify the tar utility version: rpm -q tar and examine if custom Fedora patches exist in: rpm -q --changelog tarAffected if Using Fedora 35, 36, or 37 with tar processing that could handle specially crafted archives
-
Check system tar utilities on OpenEulerOn OpenEuler systems, verify: rpm -q tar and review: rpm -q --changelog tarAffected if Running OpenEuler 20.03 or 22.03 with tar processing capabilities
-
Test for vulnerable code pathIf source code is available, search for malloc calls on gnu_longlink without size validation: grep -n 'gnu_longlink.*malloc\|malloc.*gnu_longlink' source_files.cAffected if Code shows malloc called on gnu_longlink without prior validation of the size field being non-zero
Your environment is affected if you have libtar version less than 1.2.21 installed, or are running Fedora 35/36/37 or OpenEuler 20.03/22.03 with tar processing that could handle user-supplied tar archives without prior size validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.2.21
Update the tar processing library/code to validate the size field in tar headers before allocating memory, rejecting or properly handling archives with zero-size headers to prevent the malloc(0) call.
libtar >= 1.2.21
- 1. Identify the libtar package installed on your system using your package manager (e.g., 'rpm -qa | grep libtar' or 'dpkg -l | grep libtar')
- 2. Check the currently installed version of libtar
- 3. Upgrade libtar to version 1.2.21 or later: On Fedora, run 'dnf update libtar' or 'dnf upgrade libtar'
- 4. If you have applications that statically link against libtar, rebuild them after the upgrade to ensure they use the fixed library version
- 5. Verify the new version is installed correctly by checking 'rpm -q libtar' or equivalent
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-33643 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-33643 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data