CVE-2021-41077
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe activation process in Travis CI, for certain 2021-09-03 through 2021-09-10 builds, causes secret data to have unexpected sharing that is not specified by the customer-controlled .travis.yml file. In particular, the desired behavior (if .travis.yml has been created locally by a customer, and added to git) is for a Travis service to perform builds in a way that prevents public access to customer-specific secret environment data such as signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens. However, during the stated 8-day interval, secret data could be revealed to an unauthorized actor who forked a public repository and printed files during a build process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceDuring an 8-day window (2021-09-03 to 2021-09-10), Travis CI had a flaw in their activation process that caused customer-controlled secret environment variables (API tokens, signing keys, credentials) to be exposed to forked builds of public repositories, bypassing the intended access controls specified in .travis.yml.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 2021-09-03, <= 2021-09-10CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Review Travis CI build history for the affected windowLog into Travis CI and navigate to your repository build history. Filter or search for builds that ran between September 3, 2021 and September 10, 2021. Note the build numbers, commit SHAs, and trigger sources (e.g., push, pull request).Affected if Any builds were executed during September 3-10, 2021
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Identify pull request builds from forksIn the build history, examine the event type for builds in the affected window. Look specifically for builds triggered by pull requests (PR) where the source branch comes from a fork (indicated by a different repository name/owner in the PR title or branch name).Affected if Pull request builds from forked repositories occurred during the affected window
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Check for secret variable usage in potentially affected buildsReview the build log for each identified fork build. Look for any appearance of environment variable values that were marked as 'secure' or 'encrypted' in your .travis.yml, such as API tokens, keys, or credentials. Use the Travis CI web UI to view environment variables displayed in build logs.Affected if Secret environment variables were used in fork builds during the window
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Verify .travis.yml security settingsExamine your .travis.yml configuration file in the repository, particularly the 'env' section with 'secure:' variables, and check for 'if: type = pull_request' conditions or lack thereof. Determine whether secure variables were set to be available in pull request builds.Affected if Secure environment variables were configured and available to pull request (fork) builds
If your repository had any pull request builds from forks between September 3-10, 2021 that used secret environment variables, those secrets were likely exposed to the fork builds.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataOrganizations should audit Travis CI build logs from September 3-10, 2021, identify any secrets used in builds during that window, and proactively rotate all potentially exposed credentials including API tokens, signing keys, and access tokens.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-41077 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-41077 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data