CVE-2021-4406
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn authenticated attacker is able to create alerts that trigger a stored XSS attack. POC * go to the alert manager * open the ITSM tab * add a webhook with the URL/service token value ' -h && id | tee /tmp/ttttttddddssss #' (whitespaces are tab characters) * click add * click apply * create a test alert * The test alert will run the command “id | tee /tmp/ttttttddddssss” as root. * after the test alert inspect /tmp/ttttttddddssss it'll contain the ids of the root user.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceAuthenticated command injection vulnerability in the alert manager's webhook/ITSM integration. The URL or service token parameter does not properly sanitize input, allowing an authenticated attacker to inject shell commands that execute with root privileges. The POC demonstrates this by injecting '&& id | tee /tmp/ttttttddddssss' which executes the 'id' command as root.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 6.0.0.355CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Quantastor versionRun 'qumuloctl version' from the CLI or check the Quantastor web UI dashboard for the installed version numberAffected if Version is below 6.0.0.355
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Locate alert webhook/ITSM configurationNavigate to the Quantastor web UI under Alerts > Notification Channels or Alert Manager settings. Identify if any webhook or ITSM integration endpoints are configured and enabledAffected if Webhook or ITSM notification channels are actively configured
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Inspect webhook URL parameterExamine the configured webhook URL field in the alert notification settings. Look for shell metacharacters like &, |, ;, `, or $( ) within the URL valueAffected if The URL parameter contains shell command injection characters or unexpected syntax
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Inspect service token parameterExamine the service token or API key field in the webhook/ITSM configuration. Look for injection characters or signs of tamperingAffected if The token parameter contains shell metacharacters or unusual encoded content
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Check for POC artifactsRun 'ls -la /tmp/ttttttddddssss' to see if the file from the POC exists, which would indicate exploitationAffected if The file /tmp/ttttttddddssss exists on the system
You are affected if running Quantastor version below 6.0.0.355 AND the alert manager webhook/ITSM integration is configured with injectable parameters.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.0.0.355
Implement strict input validation and sanitization on all webhook/ITSM parameters, using allowlists rather than denylists. Use parameterized APIs or sandboxed execution rather than passing user input to shell commands. Apply the principle of least privilege to limit what the alert execution process can do.
Quantastor 6.0.0.355 or later
- Upgrade Quantastor to version 6.0.0.355 or later
- After upgrade, verify the fix by attempting to create an alert webhook with command injection characters (e.g., `&&`, `|`, `;`) in the URL/token field
- Confirm that the command is treated as a literal string and not executed
- If possible, review alert webhook configurations that existed before the upgrade and remove any malicious entries
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2021-4406 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2021-4406 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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