CVE-2022-0715
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA CWE-287: Improper Authentication vulnerability exists that could cause an attacker to arbitrarily change the behavior of the UPS when a key is leaked and used to upload malicious firmware. Affected Product: APC Smart-UPS Family: SMT Series (SMT Series ID=18: UPS 09.8 and prior / SMT Series ID=1040: UPS 01.2 and prior / SMT Series ID=1031: UPS 03.1 and prior), SMC Series (SMC Series ID=1005: UPS 14.1 and prior / SMC Series ID=1007: UPS 11.0 and prior / SMC Series ID=1041: UPS 01.1 and prior), SCL Series (SCL Series ID=1030: UPS 02.5 and prior / SCL Series ID=1036: UPS 02.5 and prior), SMX Series (SMX Series ID=20: UPS 10.2 and prior / SMX Series ID=23: UPS 07.0 and prior), SRT Series (SRT Series ID=1010/1019/1025: UPS 08.3 and prior / SRT Series ID=1024: UPS 01.0 and prior / SRT Series ID=1020: UPS 10.4 and prior / SRT Series ID=1021: UPS 12.2 and prior / SRT Series ID=1001/1013: UPS 05.1 and prior / SRT Series ID=1002/1014: UPSa05.2 and prior), APC SmartConnect Family: SMT Series (SMT Series ID=1015: UPS 04.5 and prior), SMC Series (SMC Series ID=1018: UPS 04.2 and prior), SMTL Series (SMTL Series ID=1026: UPS 02.9 and prior), SCL Series (SCL Series ID=1029: UPS 02.5 and prior / SCL Series ID=1030: UPS 02.5 and prior / SCL Series ID=1036: UPS 02.5 and prior / SCL Series ID=1037: UPS 03.1 and prior), SMX Series (SMX Series ID=1031: UPS 03.1 and prior)
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceImproper authentication vulnerability in APC Smart-UPS devices allows an attacker with a leaked key to upload malicious firmware, enabling arbitrary modification of UPS behavior. The vulnerability affects multiple series across both Smart-UPS and SmartConnect families.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 04.5<= 04.2<= 02.9<= 02.5<= 02.5<= 02.5<= 03.1<= 03.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify UPS model seriesLocate the APC Smart-UPS model number on the device label or management interface. Look for the series identifier: SMT, SMC, SML, SCL, or SMX in the model name (for example: SMT750, SMC1000, SCL500RM1U, SMX750).Affected if The model series is SMT, SMC, SML, SCL, or SMX and matches one of the affected series IDs: 1015, 1018, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1036, or 1037.
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Check installed firmware versionAccess the UPS management web interface or use the APC PowerChute software to view the firmware version. The version is typically displayed in the device info or about section.Affected if The firmware version is at or below the vulnerable threshold: SMT 1015 series <= 04.5, SMC 1018 series <= 04.2, SML 1026 series <= 02.9, SCL 1029/1030/1036 <= 02.5, SCL 1037 <= 03.1, or SMX 1031 <= 03.1.
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Verify network management card statusCheck if the UPS has a Network Management Card (NMC) installed and enabled. Access the NMC web interface or check via PowerChute Network Shutdown. Look for network configuration settings that indicate NMC is active.Affected if A Network Management Card is installed and configured with network access, as this provides the remote interface through which firmware upload with a leaked key could be attempted.
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Review external exposure of management interfaceExamine network firewall rules and access lists to determine if the UPS management web interface (typically ports 80/443) or NMC is reachable from untrusted networks or the internet.Affected if The UPS management interface is accessible from outside the trusted network, increasing the likelihood of an attack using a leaked key.
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Audit for key compromise indicatorsReview access logs from the UPS management interface or NMC for signs of unauthorized firmware upload attempts, unfamiliar administrative sessions, or authentication anomalies.Affected if Any evidence of unauthorized access, unexpected firmware uploads, or authentication anomalies suggests the vulnerability may have been exploited.
A user is affected if they operate one of the listed APC Smart-UPS series with firmware at or below the specified thresholds and the device has network management capabilities accessible from a network where a leaked key could be obtained.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedOrganizations should identify affected devices using the series IDs and firmware versions listed, update to patched firmware versions beyond those specified, rotate any compromised keys, and review access controls around UPS management interfaces.
Firmware versions greater than: SMT 1015 >04.5, SMC 1018 >04.2, SMTL 1026 >02.9, SCL 1029/1030/1036 >02.5, SCL 1037 >03.1, SMX 1031 >03.1 (specific versions per model available in SEVD-2022-022-01)
- 1. Identify the exact model number and current firmware version of the affected UPS device
- 2. Consult the Schneider Electric security notification (SEVD-2022-022-01) on www.se.com for model-specific fixed firmware versions
- 3. Download the appropriate firmware update from Schneider Electric's official support portal
- 4. Follow Schneider Electric's firmware upgrade procedure documented in the UPS user manual
- 5. Verify the firmware upgrade was successful and the device is operating normally
- 6. Ensure the device is no longer accessible from untrusted networks after patching
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2022-0715 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2022-0715 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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